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 PETER L. STRAUSS*
 Professor Strauss presents in this article a detailed case study of policy-
 making by the Department of the Interior in its administration of mining law.
 The antiquated nature of the General Mining Law of 1872, essentially un-
 changed since its enactment, has placed a great responsibility for "writing"
 the law of mining claims upon the Department, highlighting the problems that
 exist with the Department's internal allocation of its policymaking flfnction.
 7he foculs of this piece is a study of those problems and an examination
 of possible remedies. Professor Strauss criticizes, in particular, the inacces-
 sibility of Depart,ment "law" and the Department's excessive reliance upon
 adjudication rather than rltlemaking to make policy. Even thoulgh rulemaking
 would create a more accessible body of agency policy and procedure, increase
 public participation and advance other jurisprttdential values, bureaucratic
 obstacles currently discourage resort to this vehicle. Moreover, the Depart-
 ment's rulemaking branch has virtually no control over the adjudicatory body,
 leaving essentially unfettered policymaking power in the hands of a body
 whose own procedures make it unsuited for the task; this bifurcation of the
 rulemaking and adjudicatory fulnctions within the Department has also resulted
 in an incoherent and inconsistent overall departmental policy.
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 INTRODUCTION
 As the Supreme Court has reminded us in the Term just concluded,
 it may seem more sensible for administrative agencies to formulate important
 policy for general application through the promulgation of rules than through
 the haphazard processes of litigation, but few tools exist for forcing that
 choice.' The Court was appropriately skeptical of the value of rigid require-
 ments or judicial supervision in this sphere; while not denying the possibility
 that an agency's discretion to allocate policy formulation between rulemaking
 and adjudication could be abused, the Court was not disposed to find such
 abuse where Judge Friendly for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had
 found it, in the much-debated providential advantages of one or the other form
 of agency action for creation of sound policy.2 If such an abuse is ever to be
 found, it hinted, it will only be in circumstances in which new policy sharply
 departs from prior practice, and the adverse consequences of imposing liability
 for actions undertaken in reliance on the prior rules are severe.3
 Although scholarly and judicial consideration of the problem has been
 directed chiefly to the National Labor Relations Board and other independent
 federal regulatory agencies,4 the most dramatic legislative proposal for control
 of that choice may have emerged from the Report of the Public Land Law
 Review Commission.5 That bipartisan public body was commissioned by
 Congress to map a program of legislative action that would bring the country's
 public land laws out of their present chaos, and the agencies administering
 them into greater efficiency.6 The Commission recommended that "Congress
 should require public land management agencies to utilize rulemaking to the
 fullest extent possible in interpreting statutes and exercising delegated discre-
 tion, and should provide legislative restrictions to insure compliance with
 this goal."7 The product of this recommendation was a bill introduced into the
 House during the Ninety-second Congress, which, among its other effects,
 would have prohibited public land agencies from effecting any change in
 1. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974).
 2. Coimpare id. at 1770-72 with Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc. v.
 NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495-97 (1973).
 3. 94 S. Ct. at 1771-72.
 4. Id.; NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); SEC v. Chenery, 332
 U.S. 194 (1947) ; NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Corp., 355 F.2d 854, 859-61 (2d Cir. 1966);
 Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative
 Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Robinson, The Making of Administrative
 Policy: Antother Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Adminlistrative Procedure
 Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemlaking or Adjudi-
 cation in the Developlment of Adminiistrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965) ; Peck,
 The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J.
 729 (1961).
 5. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970)
 [Hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
 6. 43 U.S.C. ?? 1391-1400 (1970); see H.R. REP. No. 1008, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
 (1964); S. REP. No. 1444, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
 7. PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 251-53.
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 policy except through the medium of rulemaking, and would have forbidden
 application against the interests of any private person of any standard or
 interpretation not previously embodied in a statute or departmental regulation.8
 Vigorously opposed as a prescription for administrative paralysis by Roger
 Cramton, then Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United
 States,9 the bill never reached the House floor. The effort, however, suggests
 that a study of the allocation of policymaking between rules and adjudication
 in the Department of the Interior, the chief land management agency, may bear
 on the general debate.
 The study which follows grew out of a project undertaken for the
 Administrative Conference during the summer of 1972. The study was princi-
 pally concerned with the Department's adjudicatory procedures for determining
 the validity of mining claims asserted under the General Mining Law of 1872 ;10
 those results will be published elsewhere presently.l1 One quickly discovered,
 however, that the adjudication and the bureaucratic processing leading up to it
 rest on a complex and often hidden body of internal "law" interpreting the
 rather sparse provisions of the mining statutes. It became natural to ask how
 that policy was formulated and applied, where and how it could be found by
 the interested prospector or his lawyer, and what factors (short of the
 draconian measures proposed in the House of Representatives) might tend to
 rationalize the policymaking function and make existing policy more accessible.
 The question is complicated, as will appear, by the placement of public land
 8. H.R. 7211, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. ? 6(g) (1971).
 9. Hearings on H.R. 7211 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the House
 Conmin. on Insular and Interior Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-20, at 73-76 (1971);
 sce also id. at 148-49, 166-67.
 10. 30 U.S.C. ?? 21-43 (1970).
 11. Strauss, Procedures of the Department of the Interior With Respect to Mining
 Claiimls on Public Lands, to be published in 1974 UTAH L. REV. 185. Recommendations
 generated by the study were adopted by the Administrative Conference May 30, 1974.
 Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 74-3: Procedures of
 The Department of The Interior with Respect to Mining Claimts on Public Lands.
 In addition to the fairly extensive literature generated by the importance of the
 matters discussed to the mining industry, by the work of the Public Land Law Review
 Commission, see C. McFarland's excellent ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC
 LANDS (1969), and by the prospects of reform that the Commission's work has generated,
 the study drew on extensive, if somewhat impressionistic, interviews conducted during
 the summer of 1972. Four weeks in Denver, and one in Salt Lake City, permitted interviews
 with most of the personnel responsible for the minerals program in the Colorado and
 Utah State Offices and the Denver (Regional) Service Center of the Department's Bureau
 of Land Management, the Denver and Salt Lake City Regional Solicitor's Offices of the
 Department of Interior, the Department's Salt Lake City Administrative Law Judges, and
 the corresponding officials of the Department of Agriculture and its National Forest
 Service. It was possible to obtain unrestricted access to the files in all these places. During
 the same period, it was also possible to talk with a number of lawyers who had had a
 broad range of experience with the Department in these matters, in both private and
 public practice. These included a former Assistant Attorney General of the United States
 responsible for litigation involving the Department of the Interior, now in private practice;
 house counsel for a large mining firm; counsel for a conservation organization; and several
 counsel in private practice who frequently represent mining interests, both large and small.
 Conversations in Washington with members of the Solicitor's Office, the Bureau of Land
 Management, and the Office of Hearings and Appeals, both before and after this period,
 confirmed much of what had been learned.
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 administration in an executive department, whose single titular head cannot
 supply in more than nominal capacity the coordination of policy for which he
 is ostensibly responsible. The following pages present these aspects of the
 Report to the Conference.
 I. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL MINING LAW: BACKGROUND
 The General Mining Law, essentially unchanged in these respects since
 its enactment, permits prospectors who have found valuable minerals on public
 lands-or, in practice, a likely spot for their occurrence-to mark off, or locate,
 a limited area of the ground as a claim; the details of this ritual are left to
 state law.12 While he ordinarily need not state as part of his claim what
 minerals he believes he has found, the prospector acquires no rights against
 the federal government until actual discovery of a "valuable mineral." At that
 moment, assuming all other necessary rituals have been performed, the locator
 acquires an absolute right of possession against the Government to use his land
 for mining purposes-a right which has been strongly and uniformly described
 as "property in the fullest sense of that term."13 The moment of "discovery"
 is thus a crucial event, and the concept of "discovery," central. Should the
 land be administratively withdrawn from the operation of the mining laws
 before that point, no valid claim attaches; and should any dispute arise as to
 the validity of the claim, the issue of discovery is likely to be the decisive point.
 Such disputes arise chiefly in two contexts. The General Mining Law
 provides that a miner may acquire a patent to his claim, fee simple title, on
 payment of a few dollars per acre and demonstration to the Department of
 the Interior that he has made a discovery and has invested at least $500 work
 in the development of his claim. The miner may also have to defend the
 validity of his location if the government initiates a contest proceeding, a
 proceeding usually brought only if an actual conflict exists over the use of the
 land (such as would be occasioned by a withdrawal) or if it proposed to deny
 a patent application. Patent applications are in fact comparatively rare.14 The
 application process has become increasingly complex, time-consuming and
 expensive over the years, and a miner who fails to establish the validity of
 12. 30 U.S.C. ?? 22, 26, 28, 35 (1970); cf., e.g., 43 C.F.R. ? 3831.1 (1973) (location
 of placer claims). The state laws are described in 1 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW
 FOUNDATION, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING ?? 5.45-5.80 (1973) [hereinafter cited as AMI.
 L. MINING] and in a report prepared for the Public Land Law Review Commission, 2
 TWITTY, SIEVWRIGHT & MILLS, NONFUEL MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE PUBLIC LANDS,
 503-48 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NONFUEL MINERALS].
 13. See, e.g., Best v. Humboldt Placer Min. Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335 (1963); Wilbur
 v. United State ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316 (1930); Black v. Elkhorn Min. Co.,
 163 U.S. 445, 449 (1896).
 14. Between 1961 and 1970, only 631 mineral patents, covering 81,697 acres were
 issued; an additional 300 mill sites, small tracts associated with mineral claims, were also
 patented. Hearings on H.R. 7211 Before the Subcoimm. on the Environment of the House
 Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-20, at 148 (1971).
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 his claim, under departmental interpretation, stands to lose the claim as well
 as to have his application rejected.15
 Responsibility for administering the mining laws within the Department
 of the Interior falls chiefly on its Bureau of Land Management, a constituent
 part of the Department under the control of its Assistant Secretary for Public
 Lands. As the manager of over 465 million acres of public domain, the Bureau
 has numerous other responsibilities, many of them thought to be more important
 than mining matters. In Washington, however, a branch of the Bureau's
 Resources Department is responsible for coordinating minerals policy and has
 major responsibility for the Bureau's contribution to rulemaking in the area;
 the Bureau's regional offices supply further policy assistance; and each of its
 state offices includes a number of mineral examiners and a Land Law Examiner
 responsible for the technical aspects of initiating contests, effecting proposals
 to withdraw otherwise open lands from application of the Mining Law, and
 processing patent applications.
 The Solicitor of the Department of the Interior is also a significant figure.
 The Solicitor's office comments on any proposed rulemaking, publishes
 occasional interpretive rulings, and presents the Department's case in adjudi-
 catory proceedings involving the validity of mining claims once they have
 reached the stage of active litigation. Moreover, the Solicitor exercises sub-
 stantial influence over the rulemaking process by coordinating and supervising
 efforts within the Department.
 The third constituent of the Department participating in policymaking,
 although chiefly as an incident to adjudication, is its Office of Hearings and
 Appeals. An administrative law judge associated with that office will hear the
 litigation in the first instance, and the result may be appealed to the same
 office's Board of Land Appeals, whose seven members sit in Virginia, isolated
 from the Department's center in Washington, D.C. Except for a still-theoretical
 possibility of secretarial intervention, the Board's decision is final and binding
 on the Government; judicial review is available at the behest only of a
 disappointed private litigant. Ordinarily, the Board plays little role in the
 formulation of substantive policy through rule or other general policy statement.
 While the General Mining Law confers on the Department far less
 apparent discretion than do most statutes which it administers, the antiquity
 of the law has comlbined with the changing character of the Department's
 mandate to produce considerable strain. When the statute was first enacted,
 disposal of the public domain was the governing policy; a plenitude of statutes
 then identified the appropriate uses of the public domain and provided for its
 allocation to private citizens who could give some indication that they would
 put it to those uses-in the case of mineral lands, by discovery of a mineral
 15. United States v. Carlile, 67 I.D. 417, 423-27 (1960); Terry & Stocker, 10 I.B.L.A.
 158 (1973); see Barton v. Morton, 498 F.2d 288, 292 n.8 (9th Cir. 1974).
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 deposit and the performance of limited development work. Since that time,
 increasing awareness of the finite nature of the nation's public land resources
 has led to a regime of public retention and development of the remaining lands;
 sale of these lands or provision for limiting access to their use is now excep-
 tional. This changing view of public land resources policy, however, is in
 conflict with the provisions of the General Mining Law, which permit
 possessory rights over public lands to be acquired in relative secrecy and
 make no provision for use regulation, fair compensation for value, or early
 demonstration by the claimant of the merit and good faith of his claim.
 These further elements are inconsistent with a policy of public retention
 and development of the public domain, whether or not one believes, as mining
 industry spokesmen do, that free exploration of public lands and acquisition
 of possessory rights upon discovery are the most effective stimulants for mineral
 development. And this inconsistency, undoubtedly, has led the Department into
 a grudging and somewhat tight-fisted approach towards claims made under the
 mining laws. In an effort to prevent unwarranted dispositions and misuse,
 standards are applied with increasing rigor and traumatic consequences are
 visited upon failure to meet them. Yet while miners complain that the Depart-
 ment is thus "making policy" rather than "applying the law," the Department
 cannot tenably be required to ignore the striking changes in its general mandate,
 even if this particular statute has been more durable than most. In the years
 since the statute was passed, the Department, like all other administrative
 bodies, has had to make policy to conform the statute as closely as possible
 to its other tasks and general charge. The appropriate questions are how,
 and how well, the Department has done that work. This assessment cannot
 be made simply from the perspective of efficiency, either in processing claims
 or retaining public lands in government hands; fairness to claimants and the
 adequacy of departmental procedures in honoring claimants' reasonable expec-
 tations and in furthering the residual congressional purpose expressed in the
 statute must also be considered.
 II. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S "HIDDEN LAW"
 While the General Mining Law itself has not been significantly amended
 since 1872, intervening crises have led Congress to surround it with a variety
 of exceptions and special rules and procedures. Claims must occasionally be
 registered with the government, but usually not;16 rights acquired under a
 claim vary from statute to statute in minute, unpredictable and often inexpli-
 cable ways.17 This confusion cries for rationalization by statute, hopefully
 16. Registration is required for withdrawals on power sites, 30 U.S.C. ?? 621-625
 (1970), coal lands, id. ?? 541-541i (1970), and certain revested forest lands in Oregon,
 43 U.S.C. ? 1181 (1970).
 17. For example, claims under the coal lands statute are limited in duration, 30 U.S.C.
 ? 541i (1970), but claims under the other two statutes are not limited; two of the statutes
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 forthcoming. In the meantime, it has produced a babel of regulations mirroring
 and often expanding upon the statutory inconsistencies and confusion,18 and
 creating an urgent need for information about the functioning and policies of
 the Department and the Bureau.
 The "small man" character of many prospectors and the high level of
 suspicion and distrust with which they appear to regard the Bureau make
 openness about policy particularly important. By and large, the Bureau is not
 an agency that deals with large corporate interests able to acquire sophisticated
 legal services for their dealings with government. Small miners and their
 lawyers can little afford searching hither and yon for traces of the Bureau's
 operating law; the need to do so contributes significantly to their view that
 the agency is arbitary and undeserving of their cooperation.19 For the small
 miner, any confrontation with the local representative of "big government"
 involves a decided imbalance of resources. The Bureau has responded to the
 demands of such a setting well in other contexts ;20 clarity and concision are
 equally called for here.
 Despite the apparent utility of rules in such circumstances, the Depart-
 ment's use of its rulemaking powers is viewed by nearly all as insufficient.21
 have been construed to require that the notice tie the claim to the public land survey, 43
 C.F.R. ?? 3721.1(d) (coal lands), 3821.2 (revested lands) (1973), while the third, like
 the General Mining Law, has not.
 18. C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 238,242.
 19. Their attitude appears to this observer to represent more folklore than fact, for
 local administrators seem thoughtful and concerned. Yet few conversations outside
 governmental circles were unmarked by distrust of agency motives.
 20. For example, the Federal Range Code successfully consolidates in regulatory
 form most Bureau policies dealing with grazing rights. 43 C.F.R. ?? 4110-4714 (1973).
 21. See, e.g., PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 251-52; C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11,
 at 232-61, 306-10; McCarty, A View of the Decision-Making Process Within the
 Department of Interior, 19 A.B.A. ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 168-72; Carver & Landstrom,
 Rulemaking as a Means of Exercising Discretion in Public Actions, 8 ARIZ. L. REV.
 46 (1966). No such problem seems to have been uncovered by the Attorney General's
 Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1941, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERN-
 MENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7 at 55 (1941) (Department
 of the Interior); see Bloomenthal, Admlinistrative Procedures, in Symposium on the
 Public Land Lawe Reviezw Comm1ission Report, 6 LAND & W.L. REV. 1, 241 (1970).
 The expectation that public land agencies would adopt their major policies by widely
 published rules is not a new one; it was expressed at the nation's birth, when land was
 our principal asset. Professor McFarland quotes the following passage submitted to the
 House of Representatives in 1790, by the then Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander
 Hamilton, in conjunction with his Plan for Disposing of the Public Lands:
 That the Commissioners of the General Land Office shall, as soon as may be,
 from time to time, cause all the rules and regulations, which they may establish,
 to be published in one gazette, at least, in each State, and in each of the Western
 Governments where there is a gazette, for the information of the citizens of the
 United States. Regulations like these will define and fix the most essential particu-
 lars which can regard the disposal of the Western lands, and where they leave
 any thing to discretion will indicate the general principles or policy intended by
 the Legislature to be observed: for a conformity to which the Commissioners will,
 of course, be responsible. They will, at the same time, leave room for accommo-
 dating to circumstances, which cannot, beforehand, be accurately appreciated, and
 for varying the course of proceeding, as experience shall suggest to be proper,
 and will avoid the danger of those obstructions and embarrassments in the
 execution, which would be to be apprehended from an endeavor at greater precision
 and more exact detail.
 1974]  1237
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 12 May 2016 18:38:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
 "[T]he making of regulations by and large has been the instrument of routine
 administration rather than one for the formulation of policy."22 Policy is formu-
 lated through Manual directives, temporary directives, Solicitor's opinions,
 or-particularly in the case of the mining laws-through case adjudication
 under the pressure of day-to-day emergencies.
 Adjudication has seemed less satisfactory than rulemaking as a vehicle
 for policy formulation. It is inherently easier for either Congress to exercise
 oversight responsibilities or private individuals to acquire information about
 policy from a collection of current regulations than from a series of adjudica-
 tions, often changing in tone and direction with changes in administration or
 in administrative imperatives. The problems of divining law from case (lecisions
 are compounded when some of the (lecisions that may be relied upon are
 available in one place, some in another, and others hardly at all. WVhen the
 possibility arises that important shifts of policy will occur in litigation, few of
 those affected will be notified, and the quality of representation afforlded Irivate
 interests in the case cannot be assured.23
 On the most basic level, as Professor McFarland points out,24 the Depart-
 ment has failed to make clear to the public its own internal structure. The
 Department takes literally the requirement of section 3 of the Administrative
 Procedure Act25 that it publish "in the Federal Register" its organizational
 structure, including organizational descriptions and a guide to the public
 indicating how it may get information or decisions or make submittals or
 requests. Such notices are published in the Register but are not consolidated
 in the Code of Federal Regulations or elsewhere.26 The entry for the Bureau
 of Land Management in the Government Organization Manual is brief and
 unhelpful; Parts 1000 to 1719 of the Department's regulations, reserved to set
 out "General Management" regulations governing the Bureau, stand vacant.
 Parsing the Bureau's structure through the Federal Register is a complex and
 unrewarding task. Perhaps the fault lies in part, as Professor McFarland
 suggests, in the wording of section 3.27 Publication "in the Federal Register,"
 28 AM. STATE PAPERS (Public Lands, I) 8-9 (1832), quoted in C. MCFARLAND, supra
 note 11, at 232. The Department (and its predecessors) have in fact used rules widely
 since that time.
 22. C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 242.
 23. A striking example is cited in McCarty, supra note 21, at 171 n.129: In Hugh S.
 Ritter (Thomas M. Bunn) 72 I.D. 111 (1965), remanded Civ. Act. No. 2615-65 (D.D.C.,
 June 28, 1966), the Secretary announced a policy of refusing further classifications for
 agricultural use of extensive, potentially irrigable lands in California, in a case involving
 only 40 acres of land and two appellants-indeed, in this case, without the benefit of
 briefing on the issue by either party. Even if the Department gave proper notice to the
 litigants that this issue would be considered, it is at best uncertain that interests in the
 total acreage affected by the decision would be well represented by the legal services
 applicants for 40 acres could afford.
 24. C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 264-71.
 25. 5 U.S.C. ? 552 (1970).
 26. For a holding that this suffices, see United States v. Tijerina, 407 F.2d 349, 354
 n.12 (10th Cir. 1969).
 27. C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 266-67.
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 without periodic consolidation in the Code of Federal Regulations or some
 similar publication, provides inherently insufficient notice for any matter
 intended to have long-term effect.
 The spirit of section 3, whether or not fully mirrored in its words, requires
 a greater effort to make organizational information available in convenient
 form. To its credit, the Bureau distributes through its state offices a series of
 leaflet handouts, each abstracting the regulations applicable to mineral locations
 under a particular statute. But the unalloyed regulations are hardly enough.
 A lawyer representing an occasional prospector or the prospector himself
 requires some guidance to determine which of the several leaflets might apply.
 The civil servant seated behind the office's information desk, friendly and
 helpful as that officer may be, is unlikely to possess the required knowledge.
 All the attorneys interviewed shared the experience of finding through perse-
 verance a knowledgeable bureaucrat who was willing to spend the time to share
 his information with them. Each of them, however, seemed to think this his
 particular bit of luck. The public should not have to depend on the fortuity of
 finding the right official by word of mouth-even in a relatively small office
 of an agency with a proud tradition of helpful public service. Regular publication
 of a full description of the Bureau's central and field organization, showing
 relevant lines of authority, would eliminate the premium now placed on
 personal knowledge or on perseverance in tracking editions of the Register.
 This criticism applies a fortiori to the Bureau's operating procedures for
 dealing with mining matters. Here, as Professor McFarland notes, the regu-
 lations afford no realistic description of how the Bureau reaches initial
 decisions regarding mineral claims, or where information and advice on these
 matters can be obtained. The claimant
 is left to wend his way through the alminiistrative jungle by such
 word of mouth instructions as he may obtain from officials of all
 (legrees-which he may follow or not at his peril.Y8
 For example, responding to miner fears of Bureau arbitrariness in bringing
 actions to contest the validity of mining claims, the Bureau has adopted a
 variety of self-imposed limitations: contests will be brought only in cases of
 (lemonstrable need-where a patent application appears insufficient, where an
 application for a competing use is in hand, where a withdrawal has been
 made, or, more recently, where there is flagrant abuse or trespass; multiple
 proceedings against the same lands will be avoided. These policies have been
 announced in speeches or by other informlal means, with copies circulated in
 memorandum form within the Bureau, but have not been formally published.
 Helpful policy information is frequently absent from the Department's
 regulations.29 The Department treats an enormous body of general statement
 28. Id. at 159-60.
 29. For example, the concept of "discovery" is central to the validity of mining
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 about policy and procedure-including matters it treats as binding in adminis-
 trative litigation-as suitable for staff manuals and instructions rather than
 rulemaking. For example, the Manual provisions regarding applications for
 patents contain several requirements, unmentioned in the regulations, which
 must be met before a patent can issue. In the Colorado office, applications have
 been sent back for correction on these grounds, to the understandable conster-
 nation of the lawyers involved.30 Unlike the regulations, the Manual provisions
 also reflect detailed interpretations of concepts central to claims validity or
 patent issuance-the meaning assigned to "discovery," or the definition of the
 necessary "contiguity" of two claims covered by a single application.31 Again,
 both the Bureau Manual and the Forest Service Manual contain the "treaty"
 between the two organizations, allocating responsibility between them for the
 various aspects of processing mining claims on Forest Service Lands; this
 otherwise unpublished document figured importantly in a recent administrative
 appeal, providing the reason why a policy governing conduct within the Bureau
 would not apply.32 Materials such as these need never be published in the
 Federal Register,33 with or without an opportunity for comment after proposal,
 and never appear in the Code. Under section 3(b) of the Administrative
 Procedure Act, it suffices that the Bureau makes available manuals and instruc-
 tions for public inspection and copying, although they may also be published
 an(d offered for sale.34
 To say that the manuals are available for inspection, moreover, is some-
 what misleading. While the relevant staff is helpful and aware of the obligation
 to produce the manuals,35 the manuals are unwieldy and, in part, outdated.
 The Bureau Manual, for example, is divided into two editions, old and new,
 each rather poorly indexed and comprising several looseleaf volumes. Entries
 bearing directly on the General Mining Law have not yet been revised, and
 so remain in the "old" Manual; but some other relevant provisions, such as
 policy objectives in mineral development, instructions on mineral reports and
 policies concerning classification and withdrawal, are in the "new" Manual.
 And what is in either edition may be affected by supplemental "temporary"
 claims. Despite a 100-year history of elaboration of its meaning by the Department, no
 attempt at definition appears in the regulations.
 30. E.g., VI BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANUAI
 ? 3.1.8F (1958) [hereinafter cited as BLM, MANUAL]. The same criticism may be applied
 to the corresponding sections of the Forest Service Manual. Sec generally PLLRC REPORT,
 supra note 5, at 252.
 31. E.g., VI BLM, MANUAL ? 5.2.12C; id. ? 3.1.15B(3). While these interpretations
 are in the form of instructions to claims examiners, they do not constitute the sort of
 instructions regarding permissible departures from an announced norm or negotiation
 stance that could prove embarrassing if widely disseminated.
 32. Ed Bergdal, 74 I.D. 245 (1967).
 33. In fact, the Bureau and the Department have each published a few Manual
 provisions concerned with environmental matters in the Federal Register, 36 Fed. Reg.
 19343 (1971); 37 Fed. Reg. 15015 (1972), but neither follows a consistent practice of
 publishing entries of public significance.
 34. 5 U.S.C. ? 552(a)(2) (1970).
 35. 43 C.F.R. ? 2.5(e) (1973).
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 instructions, which may or may not have been filed with the Manual provisions
 affected and which may or may not still be operative.3; Or, as now seems to be
 the case with respect to the instructions concerning mining claims, there may
 be an office understanding that the stated procedures, unrevised in almost two
 decades, will no longer be followed.
 Mere availability of the Manual for inspection and copying fails to satisfy
 the Department's publication responsibilities for at least two other reasons.
 Since the Manual is not included in the departmental indexes, the Department
 may not rely on it to any outsider's detriment, absent actual notice.37
 Further, the failure to differentiate materials more properly contained in
 regulations from staff instructions and other less general matter appropriate
 to the Manual38 creates the appearance that the Manual constitutes part of the
 agency's governing law, and thus undermines the argument that the Manual
 as a whole lacks authority to bind the Bureau or the Department3^"-an
 argument unanimously maintained by departmental attorneys and Bureau
 officials. Their reluctance arises in part from apprehensions about the Manual's
 36. These "temporary" directives are particularly obscure, yet may affect quite
 significant matters, such as Bureau interpretations of the Department's published rules.
 Their preparation is as thorough as Manual directives, yet their inevitable effect is to
 postpone, often indefinitely, the issuance of corresponding manual instructions. No reason
 appears why the Bureau could not imitate the Geological Survey and issue these directives
 in the form of Manual additions. Reliance on temporary directives in dealing with mining
 law matters, to the exclusion of Manual revision, promotes "hidden law."
 37. A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or
 instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited
 as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if-
 (i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided
 by this paragraph; or
 (ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
 5 U.S.C. ? 552(a) (2) (1970). The indexing requirement could be a useful safeguard
 against "hidden law," particularly if, as seems to have been expected, only matters of
 significance are included in the indexes. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965);
 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966). Professor Davis suggests that indexes
 should contain cvery matter required by section 3 to be made available for inspection and
 copying, however insignificant. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 141 (Supp.
 1970). His unnecessary interpretation tends to disserve the requirements' broad purpose.
 Such catholicity is not required for protection of the citizen from secret law, encourage-
 ment of agencies to organize their law in an accessible and rational fashion, or assurance
 to the citizen of a reasonable opportunity to conform his behavior to applicable norms, as
 long as only indexed law is applied. A comprehensive index would include far more than
 required to show the working law of the agency and indeed, would tend to submerge it. As
 a practical matter, too, such an index could be maintained only at a central location,
 defeating in this way also its informative purpose. From the litigant's, if not the scholar's,
 perspective, the agency's law is once again inaccessible if such a central index may serve
 as authority for adverse use of any matter listed on it. See note 48 intfra.
 38. Inquiry produced few indications that this differentiation is made on the basis
 of rational principle. While new statutes or revisions of present regulations are dealt
 with by regulation, what has traditionally been dealt with in the Manual continues to be
 so, without examination as to whether developing importance might warrant a shift to
 the regulations.
 39. Since the possible binding effect of the Manual does not constitute reliance
 "against a party other than an agency," it is not formally foreclosed by section 3(a) (2)
 of the Administrative Procedure Act. A court could give the Manual binding effect in
 favor of private parties, on finding that it is part of the Department's governing law. See
 National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 343 F. Supp. 696 (D. Mont. 1972), 2 EN-
 VIRON L. REP. 20571-73; Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972).
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 accuracy and the comparatively informal manner in which it is produced,40
 perhaps more from a fear that red tape would thus be made enforceable.4' But
 if the Manual contains matters of general importance, ignored in the regula-
 tions, it is hard to believe that such enforcement can be avoided.42
 The 1966 revisions of section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act43
 again may be partially responsible for the Department's reliance on MTanual
 instructions to do the work of regulations. Previously, the section provided
 only that "A person may not in any manner . . . be adversely affected by a
 matter required to be published in the Federal Register [that is, rules, policy
 and interpretations of general applicability] and not so published." The 1966
 revisions added a directive that "staff manuals and instructions to staff that
 affect a member of the public" must be made available but need not be published.
 The effect was to soften the protection afforded by the publication requirement,
 by appearing to endorse the concept that some statements of policy and inter-
 pretations affecting the public need not appear in the Federal Register, or
 perhaps more importantly, in the Code of Federal Regulations. The provision's
 history gives no indication that Congress considered any such effect. It would,
 of course, be undesirable to deluge the Code with the undifferentiated mass
 that appears in the Manuals, or to stifle efforts at experimentation with informal
 guidelines by requiring immediate formal consolidation of all Manual provisions
 into the Code. Still, the public must be assured ready access to matters which
 affect it. The Department should vigorously review its regulations to assure
 that all basic procedures and substantive rules appear in the Department's
 regulations, and it should discipline itself to rely in its dealings with the public
 only on those rules or policy statements-to the exclusion of Manual entries
 and other unpublished policy statements.
 The other important, perhaps principal, sources of departmental law are
 the opinions expressed in departmental adjudication concerning mining claims
 and, less pronminently, the formal opinions of its Solicitor. The Department has
 been publishing major precedents and Solicitor's opinions, with comprehensive
 volume indexes, since enactment of the Mining Law. From 1965 on, it has
 also indexed its "important" unpublished decisions; these indices can be easily
 obtained.44 Even so, the Department's case law is obscure in important respects.
 The bulk of its decisions are not printed for general distribution, but circulated
 40. See text accompanying note 62 infra.
 41. A manual's function as a cohesive force within a bureaucracy, cf. H. KAUFMAN,
 THE FOREST RANGER (1960), is its central rationale; but that function is distinguishable
 from-indeed, possibly threatened by-the prospect of external enforcement.
 42. National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 343 F. Supp. 696 (D. Mont. 1972),
 2 ENVIRON L. REP. 20571-73; cf. James C. Goodwin, 9 I.B.L.A. 139, 155 (Geological
 Survey Manual definition of "workability" under Mineral Leasing Act); Stokes v.
 Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973).
 43. 5 U.S.C. ? 552(a)(2) (1970), amending 5 U.S.C. ? 552(a)(2) (1964).
 44. See 43 C.F.R. ? 2.4(a) (3) (1973) ; Parriott, The Adminiistrative Procedure Act
 and the Departmlent of the Interior, 4 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 431, 436-39 (1958).
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 to a limited audience in looseleaf form. Counsel in private practice repeatedly
 complain that the Department draws no distinction between printed and
 unprinted decisions in its adjudication. Section 3(b) of the Administrative
 Procedure Act, as revised in 1966, clearly permits reliance on unpublished
 decisions, as long as they have been indexed and made available for inspection
 and copying.45 That should not, however, obscure the handicap borne by the
 private practitioner, who finds even those unprinted decisions which have
 been indexed essentially unavailable. Cases decided before 1955, when the
 Department began publication of its indexes, are yet more obscure.
 Agencies such as the Department, which do print some final opinions,
 hardly need rely on unprinted opinions dealing with the same range of issues.
 Abandoning that practice would be particularly easy and appropriate for
 unprinted decisions predating the index. The policy judgments there are no
 longer fresh, and reliance on them is no more wise or necessary than it is fair.
 Even as to indexed but unprinted opinions, however, reliance can and should
 be avoided. While lawyers predictably use prior opinions to influence or
 justify the outcome of subsequent cases, administrative use of precedent is
 frequently an illusion in any event; it is surely so for the Department's un-
 printed opinions. The decision to print or not is premised on an assessment of
 the policy importance of the decision in question. Several federal courts of
 appeal which have recently provided for unpublished decisions have adopted
 rules forbidding their citation as precedent, apparently reflecting apprehensions
 that they are less available and the desire to point out the relative unimportance
 of these decisions.46 The Internal Revenue Service follows the samle practice.47
 The propriety of a similar rule here is forcefully apparent.48
 45. 5 U.S.C. ? 552(a) (2) (1970) ; Foster v. Jensen, 296 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Cal.
 1966). The indexing requirement applies only to decisions reached after July 4, 1967.
 46. D.C. CIR. R. 8(b); O1TH CIR. R. 17(c); cf. 5TH CIR. R. 21; 8TH CIR. R. 14.
 47. K. DAVIs, supra note 37, at 130 n.34.
 48. Professor Davis seems to argue both sides of the issue. For determining which
 rules, policies and interpretations must be published in the Federal Register under section
 3(a), and which may be merely indexed and held available for public inspection, he finds
 the "natural line of distinction," in the face of completely unhelpful legislative history, to
 be whether or not the matter will be relied upon by the agency as precedent. With respect
 to adjudicatory opinions, however, he doubts that agencies should be permitted to resolve
 such issues by their publication decisions: "A private party who wants to know the agency's
 law should be entitled to make his own determination of what precedents have value."
 Id. at 140.
 Perhaps two separable issues stand confused here. Section 3 unquestionably permits
 any interested citizen to find out what the agency's unpublished decisions have been, so
 that he may let it be known that its law is not what it says it is, if that is the fact.
 Cf. Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 686 (1962). Absent a showing verging
 on arbitrariness, however, it does not follow that the agency will be any more bound by
 its unpublished opinions than a private party. Indeed, one could not tenably hold the
 agency to its unpublished decisions without permitting it to rely upon them, as well, when
 they were to its advantage. And by that incursion, the battle to keep the task of finding
 the agency's law within manageable limits is lost. Whatever may be the case in larger
 agencies dealing with financially more momentous issues, few miners could afford the
 legal resources necessary to plumb the unpublished as well as the published law of the
 Department of Interior; the Department's attorneys, naturally, have a rather detailed
 professional acquaintance with unpublished matters. Attractive as it sounds, then, it would
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 III. THE RULEMAKING APPARATUS
 The General Mining Law is perhaps atypical of the statutes the Depart-
 ment administers in that, except as the interstices of its rather broad formula-
 tion must be filled by interpretation, it confers little administrative discretion
 upon the Secretary. Thus, the function of controlling administrative discretion,
 as that is primarily understood, is relatively unimportant as a reason for
 additional rulemaking.49 But the Department enjoys considerable discretion in
 filling the gaps in the General Mining Law and adapting its provisions to the
 modern context; rulemaking may be a useful device for performing these
 functions. How these gaps are to be filled-by rules, manuals, temporary direc-
 tives, speeches, press releases, Solicitor's opinions, or unpublished and
 published adjudications-is also a matter of discretion, although not consciously
 exercised at the agency's head; and the principal focus of critical comment
 has been the shaping or limiting of this discretion.50
 The Department is not handicapped in its allocation among these varying
 modes of policy formulation by any want of authority to make rules. Authority
 to establish its own procedures and to adopt interpretations of the governing
 statutes would be implied where not expressly conferred;51 the Secretary's
 interpretations, while subject to judicial review for conformity with the statute
 interpreted, inevitably and properly receive broad deference,52 whether he
 adopts these interpretations after rulemaking or adjudication. In early days,
 the Department's Solicitor served both as the final departmental adjudicator
 and, through the medium of Solicitor's opinions, as the publisher of interpretive
 rulings. Although expressed as a reasoned answer to inquiry rather than in
 rule form, these rulings were in effect interpretive rules, and were treated as
 such within the Department.53
 rarely be advantageous to private parties to be able to make their own determination what
 precedents have value. The frequently marginal character of legal services rendered private
 claimants in mining contests, see text accompanying notes 18-20 supra, suggests that the
 fundamental need is for fewer and clearer guidelines-for simplicity rather than a complex
 and interwoven system of law-sources. Cf. 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
 STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS ACUS Rec. 71-73, at 24, 175 (1973); id. ACUS
 Rec. 71-75, at 33-34.
 49. Compare United States v. Kosanke Sand Corp., 12 I.B.L.A. 282, 3 ENVIRON. L.
 REP. 30017 (1973), with McFarland, The Unique Role of Discretion in Public Land4 Lacw,
 16 RoCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 35 (1971) ; K. Davis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
 50. See, e.g., C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 237; McCarty, supra note 21, at 168;
 Carver & Landstrom, supra note 21; PLLRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 251-52.
 51. Best v. Humbolt Placer Min. Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1962); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
 52. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968); compare Ness v. Fisher, 223
 U.S. 683, 691 (1912) and Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316 (1903) (Secretary's
 interpretation within possible meaning of statute and hence adopted), zwith United States
 v. George, 228 U.S. 14 (1913) and United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U.S.
 207 (1905) (regulation conflicts with statute and hence impermissible) ; cf. Udall v.
 Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
 53. E.g., Rights of Mining Claimants to Access over Public Lands to Their Claims,
 66 I.D. 361 (1959). While the practice of giving opinions on such matters within the
 Department of course remains, public notice of these opinions has become quite rare; even
 1244  [Vol. 74:1231
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 12 May 2016 18:38:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MINING LAW
 Authority to adopt "legislative" rules, having substantive effect indepen-
 dent of their possible use to guide agency adjudications, does require statutory
 grant, but that is clearly given by the umbrella rulemaking provision of the
 public lands title of the United States Code.54 This power has occasionally
 been exercised in connection with the General Mining Law.55 Most often,
 however, the rules have done little more than restate the statutes-important
 enough for its function of consolidating relevant law in a form miners and
 their lawyers may find easier to deal with, but hardly sufficient.56
 A. Internal Obstacles to Rulemaking
 The failure to use rulemaking is far less a product of conscious depart-
 mental choice than a result of impediments to the making of rules created by
 the Department's internal procedures. The channels which lead to rulemaking,
 and to a lesser extent other forms of legislative policy statement such as pro-
 duction of the Manual, are so clogged with obstacles, and the flow through
 them so sluggish, that staff members hesitate to use them. Several years may
 when the opinions are published, they may no longer be considered binding in departmental
 adjudication.
 54. The Secretary of the Interior, or such officer as he may designate, is authorized
 to enforce and carry into execution, by appropriate regulations, every part of the
 provisions of this title not otherwise specially provided for.
 43 U.S.C. ? 1201 (1970). The "this title" referred to is not Title 43, which has never been
 codified, but Title XXXII of the Revised Statutes, which includes the General Mining
 Law. Historical Note, 43 U.S.C. ? 1201 (1970); 30 U.S.C. ? 21 (1970).
 55. Most recently, the Department has adopted a rule requiring "substantial com-
 pliance" with the statutory requirement of periodic work to maintain the validity of a
 claim against the United States. 43 C.F.R. ? 3851.3 (1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 17836 (1972).
 The rule draws upon the recent Supreme Court decision in Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp.,
 400 U.S. 48 (1970), for its standard of substantial compliance. As it appears in the statute,
 30 U.S.C. ? 28 (1970), the requirement is absolute, but previous interpretation had made
 it appear that failure to comply affected validity only as against competing prospectors.
 Even in adopting this rule, the Department reflected its apparent preference for policy
 development by other means. Left open were important questions: what degree of compli-
 ance would be considered substantial; whether past as well as future lapses in assessment
 work would now be taken into account in determining validity; what would be the effect
 of wholehearted resumption of work after a period of lapse but before any move toward
 cancellation had been made; and a variety of procedural issues. These questions-not
 matters of mere detail or oversight but, one suspects, reflective of inability to sustain
 agreement or impatience with matters habitually left to resolution in other settings-are
 now the subject of Bureau proceedings looking towards issuance of a "temporary
 directive" (the most "hidden" form of legislative law in the Department) and will
 eventually have to be confronted through administrative litigation. Neither line of
 development-"temporary directive" or litigation-is under direct departmental policy
 control; either could produce results prejudicial to the regulation when its validity is
 ultimately tested in court.
 56. C. MCFARLAND, slupra note 11, at 13-15, 237-40. Professor McFarland draws a
 contrast between the paucity of mineral location regulations and the "substantial and
 significant" body of regulations under the Mineral Leasing Act and the Taylor Grazing
 Act. Id. at 238. It is not quite enough, as he recognizes, to note that large public and
 industrial interests are involved in grazing and in oil and gas; the same may be said of
 the domestic mining industry. The statutes governing the first two sets of interests,
 however, are clearly regulatory in tone, and the industries involved perhaps more
 accustomed to a continuing relationship with government. The General Mining Law
 envisions, at best, occasional contact between citizen and government, and industry
 spokesmen and individual prospectors seem to share a taste for rugged individualism and
 laissez faire government that may have infected the bureaucracy as well. Regulations
 suggest planning, and that remains anathema to mining interests.
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 elapse between the initial movement towards a rule and its final promulgation.
 And like an adult game of "Telephone," Department personnel complain, what
 is suggested at the outset for possible rulemaking is often unrecognizable when
 and if a formal proposal ultimately emerges. Absent commitment at the highest
 levels, the process is one that is easily blocked at almost any stage by determined
 opposition. As a result, rulemaking may be consciously avoided by an indi-
 vidual with an idea for policy change when other means for achieving the
 same policy ends appear to be available.
 Professor McFarland, after describing at some length the procedures for
 rulemaking, set out in the Bureau manual,57 remarks:
 [T]his "manualized" statement should be enough to deter anyone
 other than a most determined administrator, or one faced with some
 crisis such as new legislation, from attempting to propose regulations
 or amendments.58
 57. [I]n 1967 there issued from the BLM Directives Office a manual section on
 Regulation Proposals explained as setting forth directions for policy as well as
 procedure. This exasperating document traverses its limited ground four times.
 It first lists the routing of staff proposals-to the Division of Management
 Analysis (for record keeping and transmittals), the Office of Legislation alnd
 Cooperative Relations ("for possible interest of outside groups"), the Office of
 Information (for "press release if necessary")-and warns against discussion
 "with members of the public" until cleared through "normal supervisory channels
 for review," cleared by the "Washington Office," and presented "if necessary"
 to advisory boards and other interested parties. Next, in authorizing, "any Bureau
 Office" to propose regulations or amendments, it commands careful drafting ("re-
 member that they must be understandable to members of the public, as well as to
 specialists in the subject field"), suggests reference to departmental solicitors for
 legal advice if necessary, save in the case of minor, or obvious proposals; requires
 "in some cases" that the "transmittal memo" contain an explanation which "is
 optional and depends on the extent and nature of the proposed changes," states
 that the Washington Office "may return draft proposals to the State Offices, for
 presentation to Advisory Boards and other interested parties, if desirable or
 required" which groups "are encouraged to send written comments to State
 Offices" and directs that "state Offices forward written comments to Washington
 with recommendations." Then, under the heading, Proposed Rule Making, it states
 that "subject matter specialists in the field and in the Washington Office evaluate
 the content of proposed regulations" and "on the basis of all comments from
 interested parties, appropriate staff and the Washington Office prepare rule
 making for approval by the Assistant Secretary, Public Land Management, or
 by the Secretary, and for publication"-to which is appended a 20-step procedure
 from "originator" to the file room for the finished product including "a substantive
 evaluation of proposed regulations affecting organization, management and pro-
 cedure." Finally, under the heading, Final Rule Making, it states that "regulations
 may be prepared in final rule making form, without going through the usual
 proposed rule making process, if they . . . impose no additional requirements on
 the public" and "do not affect rights of the public adversely"-which would be
 true of most Interior Regulations since that Department makes few significant
 affirmative regulations in the public land field-except that even such regulations
 "must be cleared through the Washington Office" in accordance with the 20-step
 routine mentioned above.
 C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 242-43 (citations omitted).
 58. Id. at 243-44. Note that all of the procedures thus described are internal procedures.
 undertaken before publication of proposed rulemaking or, where the proposal stage is
 bypassed, final rulemaking in the Federal Register; not explicitly mentioned are the
 discussions with other interested agencies, such as the Forest Service, or possible
 clearance in the Office of Management and Budget, which also occur before the proposal
 is ever made public. The twenty-step routine is not simply a formal checklist, as might
 attend the last few moments before a space flight; many of the steps involve conferences
 or clearances in which policy judgments affecting the ultimate shape of the proposal will
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 The procedures themselves do not reflect any policy determination as to when
 rulemaking is the preferred mode of policy articulation, unless general disfavor
 cal l)e inferred from the obstacles imposed. But conversations with depart-
 mental and Bureau staff invariably reflected awareness of those obstacles and,
 indeed, a resulting distaste for rulemaking.59
 Part of the sense of hopelessness about invoking rulemaking seemed to
 be caused by the failure of those up the line to respond in prompt or meaningful
 fashion to suggestions made from below. Proposals would be lost, put on the
 back burner, or rejected without explanation. Obviously, not every suggestion,
 not even most that filter up from the ranks, is worth acting upon; but all might
 be worth a direct, prompt and undlerstandlable statement of reasons why the
 proposal is inalpropriate, or what action will be taken on it. A lBureau office's
 file on one suggestion for change in regulations stretched over eleven months
 without any direct response to the suggestion from the Washington office;
 some changes in those regulations eventually were proposed, but the proposals
 were not concerned with the problems which had prompted the inquiry or the
 suggestions made for resolving them.
 There are, of course, occasions when ruleniaking is deliberately under-
 taken. A new statute which requires implementation does not present a choice
 between rulemaking and other forms of policy formulation; rules are required,
 although they are not always speedily forthcoming. Once a given block of
 rules exists, moreover, the Department follows a policy of periodic review of
 the whole."" If a matter is not originally included in such a block, however, its
 allocation to other forms of policy elaboration is unlikely to be closely re-
 examined. Outside of the "budgeted" items-new statutes and periodic
 revision-the process of allocation seems quite unconscious; in that uncon-
 scious process, the obstacles to rulemaking hit with full force. It is not that
 some supervisory figure in the Bureau or the Department makes a conscious
 choice that a proposal is appropriate for rulemaking or some other mode, for
 be made. Each change, it need hardly be added, provokes further discussion up and downt
 the line. Cf. Loevinger, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 377-79 (1968), for a par-
 ticularly emphatic, even mathematical, analysis of the over-consultation problem.
 59. Thus, an official in one office stated:
 We are not a pioneering agency . . . we want to try to stick to the good old
 steady tried and proven ways .... [We tried rule making on one occasion and]
 it never got anyplace. . . . We at this level, this lower level here, we just don't
 pioneer things other than making suggestions, and we have made suggestions-we
 have made suggestions on changing our regulations that haven't been promulgated.
 An official in another office similarly complained:
 We have made proposals from time to time. Frequently we get the argumenlt,
 on specific proposals, that the problem should be approached overall; then we do
 that, with encouragement, and it seems there is always some reason that radical
 changes aren't made. We are given more freedom and there is less control in
 handling litigation. The Department is so damn busy with day-to-day emergencies
 that it can't handle, that no one can pay attention to what we are doing in
 litigation.
 60. C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 260 n.103.
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 no standards are articulated by which that choice might be made ;61 rather,
 individuals with an idea, making a choice of the means by which they might
 seek to put it into effect or the effort that its adoption will take, choose one
 channel rather than another, or are discouraged entirely, on the basis of the
 obstacles they perceive.
 The Bureau's internal procedure for producing sections of its Manual
 is not much less complex than that required for rulemaking 62 Although no
 publication of proposed Manual sections (with attendant opportunity for
 public comment) generally occurs, and clearance with other parts of the
 Department or outside agencies such as the Forest Service is less formal
 (although it does occur if others will be affected), a multi-layered bureaucratic
 procedure must still be followed. A suggestion for new Manual sections or
 temporary directives may arise, whether from the field, from monitoring
 difficulties under existing guidelines, or from the promulgation of new regu-
 lations which must be implemented. An assignment to draw up the sections
 is made, generally far enough in advance to be part of the annual work plan
 for the office concerned; that assignment must be cleared within that office-
 generally, the Bureau's Denver Regional Service office-and within the
 Bureau's Washington office, at least at the Assistant Director level. When the
 assignment is made, the Washington office forwards a statement of the policies
 it wishes reflected in the end product to the regional office.63 That statement
 itself is necessarily the product of considerable discussion and compromise.
 The regional office then consults with interested state offices, and produces a
 draft which is circulated to all state offices for comment. A final draft is
 ultimately produced and sent to Washington, where it is closely reviewed at
 several levels for policy and feasibility, and shown to other possibly interested
 agencies. In addition to approval at each level within the Resources Division,
 the draft must be approved by one office responsible for "coordination" and
 another responsible for format and style before it reaches the Director for
 final approval. The total effect, again, is a routing so choked with obstacles
 that few proposals survive in recognizable form; and staff members facing
 the prospect of creating policy through Manual revision consequently view the
 assignment as Sisyphean.
 61. Nor is it clear that the effort to articulate them would necessarily result in more
 frequent or more rational use of rulemaking, rather than another bureaucratic hurdle
 further discouraging its use.
 62. The problem of inclusion in the Manual of matter more properly set forth in
 regulation form is discussed at text accompanying notes 29-42 supra.
 63. For example, in connection with the pending directives implementing the new
 regulation governing periodic work required to maintain a claim, see note 55 su pra, the
 Washington office might inform the Denver office whether the Bureau wished lapses in
 work occurring before the regulation was adopted to be taken into account, or whether
 its principal goal was to avoid further processing of claims which could be defeated on
 the work basis alone.
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 B. Public Participation in Rulemaking
 Although exempted by statute from the notice and comment requirements
 of the Administrative Procedure Act when its rules relate to "public prop-
 erty,"64 the Department has had a firm policy of honoring those procedures in
 any important public lands matter.65 Notice of proposed rulemaking appears in
 the Federal Register; an opportunity for comment is given; and the rules,
 when they finally appear, are attended with a summary of the comments
 received and the departmental responses to them. On occasion, when the
 matter has seemed likely to be controversial, or comments have shown it to
 be such, public hearings have been held. These are never hearings on a record,
 nor are there formal criteria for invoking them; the Department appears to
 value hearings more for reasons of public relations than for any added contribu-
 tion the opportunity to comment may make to the deliberative process.6
 Similar procedures are followed in connection with proposed withdrawals
 of lands from the operation of the mining laws. While such proposals do not
 present issues of general policy-the question invariably is whether particular
 land shall be closed to future mining claims-they are made significant by the
 antiquity of the General Mining Law, for the statute does not permit the
 Department any measure of control over the manner in which prospecting or
 development is carried out on public lands, save for minor restrictions on
 surface use.67 Consequently, when the possibility of conflict between mining
 use and another intended use looms, the Department must make a choice
 between one or the other; it does not have regulatory authority to mediate the
 possible conflict, such as may be accomplished through leases.68 The choice
 64. 5 U.S.C. ? 553(a)(2) (1970).
 65. Various histories are given of the policy, but all are in agreement that it was
 substantially in effect by the late 1950's. Parriott, supra note 44, at 442-43; McCarty,
 supra note 21, at 171; C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 245, 261 n.108. A similar policy
 has recently been adopted for all departmental rulemaking. Compare 36 Fed. Reg. 8336
 (1971) with 1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS
 AND REPORTS, ACUS REC. 16, at 29, 305 (1971).
 66. This characterization seems particularly apt with respect to the hearings occa-
 sionally held to consider proposed withdrawals-proposals which are treated as rulemaking
 in most respects. For withdrawals, formal criteria for invoking hearings do exist, V BLM,
 MANUAL ? 4.1.17; C. WHEATLEY, WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
 LANDS 404-05 (1969). But the most frequent rationale for a hearing expressed in inter-
 views was not controversiality, but that it would tend to earn good will for the Bureau
 in the community, put added force behind the proposal, or the like. Indeed, the one recent,
 straightforward issue of policy under the mining laws dealt with by rulemaking-the
 assessment work rule, note 55 supra-was quite controversial, as could have been predicted,
 but elicited no public hearing. See Sherwood, Improvement of Mining Claims, 18 ROCKY
 MT. MIN. L. INST. 149, 169-71 n.93 (1973).
 67. United States v. Kosanke Sand Corp., 12 I.B.L.A. 282, 3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30017
 (1973). Under 30 U.S.C. ? 612 (1970), surface resources not needed for mining purposes
 are reserved for the United States, but the United States is enjoined from interfering
 with the miner's reasonable use, rather than vice versa. Cf. 36 C.F.R. ? 251.12 (1973)
 (Forest Service). The point is not lost on representatives of mining interests. See, e.g.,
 Ferguson & Haggard, Regulation of Mining Activities in the National Forests, 8 LAND
 & W.L. REV. 391 (1973).
 68. The Mining Claims Rights Restoration Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. ? 621 (1970),
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 is dramatized by the result; closing the land to mining implies giving up any
 mineral resources there. Unlike trees or forage, they cannot be transplanted
 to another location. While the decision to withdraw lands from mining,
 whether by withdrawal or classification, is emphatically one the Government
 may structure as it chooses (involving as it does the use to which its own
 lands are to be put),69 few would wish by creation of a picnic ground or other
 socially insignificant use to foreclose development of a second Homestake mine.
 The Department thus acknowledges the importance of conducting an inquiry
 about the mineral potential of the land, and of having news of that inquiry
 reach persons who might be able to assist it.T7 Here, too, hearings are occa-
 makes an unsatisfactory stab in the direction of regulation for a limited class of lands
 (those possibly valuable for power plant sites), and thus illustrates the Secretary's usual
 powerlessness. Within 60 days after notice of a mining location on potential power site
 land is filed with him, as required by id. ? 623, the Secretary may hold a formal hearing on
 the question of whether mining operations would interfere with other uses of the land. His
 authority is limited, however, to three possible courses of action. He may forbid mining,
 permit it, or permit it under the single condition that restoration of the surface after
 mining be guaranteed. See United States v. Bennewitz, 72 I.D. 183, 187-88 (1965). Even
 in wilderness areas, statutory authority is limited to "reasonable" regulation of ingress
 and egress, 16 U.S.C. ?? 1133(d)(3), 1134(b) (1970); the Secretary does not have the
 authority to regulate the manner of mining in a claim once established. See Ferguson &
 Haggard, supra note 67; but cf. 39 Fed. Reg. 31317 (1974) (Forest Service).
 69. When Congress has directly authorized the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw
 or classify public lands, it usually has provided that such actions would not suspend
 operation of the mining laws on the affected lands. Pickett Act, 43 U.S.C. ?? 141-42
 (1970); Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. ? 315 (1970). Under the now-expired Classifica-
 tion and Multiple Use Act of 1964, 43 U.S.C. ? 1418 (1964), the Secretary was empowered
 to classify land to be retained in federal ownership for use exclusive of mining, but that
 Act required publication of proposed classifications in the Federal Register with an
 opportunity for comment, at least for areas larger than four square miles. Compare 43
 U.S.C. ? 1412 (1969) with id. ? 1414. Such classifications were thus virtually indistin-
 guishable from withdrawals.
 Withdrawals under these acts are said to be temporary in nature, classifying the
 land for a particular use for a possibly limited span of years, or protecting them from
 acquisition while legislation affecting them was sought. But see Raymond P. Heon, 76
 I.D. 290 (1969); Buch v. Morton, 449 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1971). Nonetheless, to effect
 withdrawals that are "permanent" in nature-for example, because a lighthouse or airport
 will be built on the land withdrawn from mining-the Secretary has long asserted that
 he can suspend the operation of the mining laws, exercising an inherent executive power
 of withdrawal. This assertion has received both executive and judicial acceptance,
 Withdrawal of Public Lands, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1941); United States v. Midwest Oil
 Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915); United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d
 432, 444-45 (9th Cir. 1971), but remains a subject for dispute. Some still seem to contend
 that the passage of the Pickett Act, with its express denial of withdrawal power in the
 mining context, served to limit the "inherent" power affirmed, with regard to earlier
 withdrawals, by Midwest Oil. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 66, at 453-67. While Buch and
 Consolidated Mines show that this view has not prevailed, there remains a fair degree of
 congressional sensitivity to "unsupervised" executive withdrawals as trenching on an
 inherently congressional domain. E.g., PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 42-44, 52-56.
 70. The Department and Bureau have adopted policy guidelines for the process, which
 are stated in part in departmental rules-and in somewhat more elaborate form in the
 respective manuals. 43 C.F.R. ?? 2350, 2450 (1973); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANUAL
 ? 603.1.1; V BLM, MANUAL ? 4.1.3, at 16; see C. WHEATLEY, supra note 66, at 387-90.
 The regulations are directed chiefly to applicants, instructing them how to apply and
 indicating that applications should be kept to a minimum; the general public is told little
 about the standards to be applied, or the information that might influence the decisional
 process. "[T]he problem of the nonfederal party is more than a mere burden of proof-it
 is a matter of not knowing what issues are viewed by officialdom as the critical ones."
 C. McFARLAND, supra note 11, at 166. Cf. Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50
 CALIF. L. REV. 381 (1962).
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 sionally held, where public interest in the proposal appears to warrant that
 step.71
 The intensity and caution of the Department's in-house procedures have
 their impact, however, on the role public comment plays both in the writing of
 rules and the determination of withdrawal questions. The initial proposal is
 the product of such careful deliberation and hard-fought compromise that little
 patience or incentive exists to deal with the public comments that may be
 received. Already the outcome of the politics of consensus, it does not easily
 admit of later adjustments. The public is involved in form, but not in substance,
 in the formulation of rules.
 This problem is especially pronounced when the prior consultations have
 included advisory bodies. The Bureau makes extensive use of advisory com-
 mittees, which tend to represent local and industrial-user interests more than
 national or conservation interests. Use of these groups as informal sources
 of information and recipients of public relations gestures is undoubtedly benefi-
 cial; however, formal consultation with them in advance of rulemaking tends
 to make proposed rulemaking even less tentative when finally made public, and
 thus doubly deprives unrepresented groups of an opportunity for equal com-
 ment. Such groups are not heard as often, and they are not heard at a truly
 formative stage.72
 In the withdrawal context, the influence of the public stage of the proce-
 dures is also reduced by other factors. Once public response to the proposal
 has been received, the Department's regulations call for a process of negotiation
 and adjustment between the Bureau and the agency seeking the withdrawal,
 to reduce the area to be withdrawn to the essential required and to protect
 71. See note 66 supra. Many of the values of a hearing could be assured, however,
 without actually holding one, if the Department were to make internal studies bearing
 on proposals available for inspection, extending the comment period where necessary to
 permit response to these materials. An example may explain the need: in considering
 proposed withdrawals, the Department has before it both public commentary on the
 proposals and a mineral survey of the area by one of its mining engineers. Since the
 Department's own survey is sparked by the same events as prompted publication of the no-
 tice of the proposal, the survey report is not usually completed before the end of the
 initial comment period. The Department regards postponement of the public comment
 period to await the survey as undesirable, since that would delay the appearance in the
 Federal Register (although not the land office records) of notice of the protective segre-
 gation of the lands which had taken place. Nonetheless, because the report might influence
 the views of commentators, as well as the Department, about the advisability of the
 withdrawal, and perhaps improve the deliberative process, the Department should make
 provision for public input after completion of the survey report, even if this entails an
 extension of the comment period. This is further trouble, to be sure, but it is probably
 less inconvenient than an oral hearing. Any added delay would not usually be a significant
 factor in the Department's deliberative processes; where speedier action is required, that
 fact would warrant, as it already does, more peremptory action.
 72. See Hearings on H.R. 7211 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the
 House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-20, at 198
 (1971). The susceptibility of the private stages of the process to influence and obstruction
 gives reason to challenge those who have seen rulemaking as a particularly democratic
 form of policy formulation. Cf. K. DAVIS, supra note 37, ? 6.16.
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 other uses to the maximum extent possible.73 The outcome is a report of
 proposed findings and action, which is given to the applicant agency; if
 unacceptable to it, the report may be put before the Director of the Bureau,
 the Secretary, and-for applicants outside the Department-the Office of
 Management and Budget for review.74 This review procedure is said to be
 little invoked, because in practice the Director and the Secretary exercise little
 supervisory power over agency requests for withdrawals.75 What is noteworthy
 about the negotiation, adjustment and review process, however, is the exclusion
 of the interested public; no participants in the comment proceedings are shown
 the Bureau's proposed action or permitted to seek its review within the Bureau
 and Department. Although treated as interested parties at one stage of pro-
 cedure, members of the public are kept from participation when, because the
 record of investigation is complete and the proposal for action has been drawn,
 their comments might have their greatest impact.76
 This restricted role for public input, together with the immediate and
 often indeterminate segregation of lands from application of the mining laws
 once a proposal for withdrawal is made, appears to be generating pressure for
 creation of a preliminary procedure in withdrawal cases like that followed in
 rulemaking, in which some interested parties are contacted and their views
 informally solicited before any formal proposal is made. Thus, an official of
 a large mining company speaks of developing good relations with Bureau (and
 Forest Service) personnel in the areas in which it is interested, in order to
 learn in advance of lands possibly marked for segregation and to attempt to
 delay action on proposals until it has had a chance to evaluate the prospects
 there.77 The Bureau shows an increasing tendency to seek mineral reports, at
 least of a preliminary nature, as part of any proposal for withdrawal; and its
 personnel refer to relationships with local mining associations or others which
 permit them to check out in advance the degree of interest in certain lands.
 There is nothing venal about consultation before decisive steps are taken;
 in a quasi-rulemaking, heavily discretionary setting such as this, it seems like
 good sense all around. Nonetheless, as in the case of departmental rulemaking
 generally, the result may be to cheapen the ostensibly public procedures by
 encouraging all compromises to be made in advance-and to be made in a
 73. 43 C.F.R. ? 2351.4(c) (1973); for withdrawals to meet Bureau needs, of course,
 this process is a wholly internal one.
 74. Id. ? 2351.5.
 75. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 66, at 485.
 76. See text accompanying note 71 supra; cf. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d
 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
 77. He concedes the expense of the effort, and remarks:
 The small miner, who can't keep his ear to the ground, wakes up one morning
 and finds the land noted, and he hasn't finished his borehole yet. It is not a good
 system or an equitable one. Even major mining company geologists may not
 know-and oughtn't to have to spend their time trying to find out.
 Cf. Reich, supra note 70, at 387-89.
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 setting in which only local and commercial interests are likely to participate.78
 If the public process is put forward as the setting through which adjustments
 will be made, it is wasteful and misleading to permit it to be duplicated by a
 more covert process, to which only some segments of the affected public are
 permitted access.
 C. The Unintended Advantages of Adjudication
 The controls over adjudication are far less rigorous, from the perspectives
 both of initiation and of ultimate policy control, than the controls over legislative
 policymaking in the Department. To consider the formulation of litigation
 strategy first, minor innovations or variations appear to be possible with little
 or no supervisory control at all: a mineral valuation specialist with a fresh
 idea about formulation of the "discovery" standard may simply draw up the
 charges against the validity of a mining claim as he believes they ought to be
 drawn; the attorney in the Regional Solicitor's Office arguing the case writes
 his brief for the proceeding before the administrative law judge with little
 supervision inside his office and none outside it. Obviously in each case the
 cooperation of others may be required at a later point-the mineral valuation
 specialist hopes that the attorney handling the complaint once it is answered,
 if it is answered, will adopt his theory; the attorney depends on acceptance of
 his approach, in the first instance, by the administrative law judge and, then,
 by his superiors in the Solicitor's Office in Washington should there be an
 appeal. But despite these contingencies, and the very large possibility that any
 litigation will wash out before the desired change is achieved, the lower
 employee has a power of initiation and control which he feels he lacks in rule-
 making or manual production; the initial shaping is his.
 Even major efforts to shape policy by litigation need not pass so many
 points of potential derailment, nor so submerge individual initiative as the
 legislative forms of policymaking appear to do. A prominent example is the
 turnaround in handling applications to patent oil shale claims which occurred
 during the summer of 1960. For the previous twenty-five years or so, the
 Department had been rather freely issuing such patents; however, as the
 value of the land became clearer and the connection between the applicants
 and the original-and often, it appears, somewhat fraudulent-locators became
 more remote, officials in the field grew increasingly disturbed over the practice
 of unrestricted patent issuance. Because an overruling of settled policy was
 required, Washington's permission was mandatory. Arguably, rulemaking
 could have been used, but one's impression is that it was never seriously
 considered; permission for a litigation campaign, unlike rulemaking, required
 no agreement over a particular form of words. Policy approval had to be
 78. Cf. Note, Managing Federal Lands, 82 YALE L.J. 787 (1972).
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 obtained-that is, the approval of the Secretary, after such consultations as
 he felt were required-and that took several efforts ;79 but there was no need
 to traverse the whole bureaucracy, and once the approval was obtained, im-
 plementation of the plan was very much a matter of individual effort.
 Moreover, any adjudicatory setting carries with it an urgency often
 lacking in the rulemaking context: a specific reclamation project awaits the
 clearing off of invalid mining claims before construction can begin; a par-
 ticular application is pending and requires action. The Department has often,
 and validly, been accused of delay in its adjudicatory processes-a problem
 which appears to be coming under greater control; but the allure of post-
 ponement for another day is nonetheless diminished where a specific case
 unavoidably requires decision.80 In the legislative context, similar impetus is
 felt only when a new or amended statute requires implementation, or some
 new judicial interpretation requires a restructuring of existing rules or guides.
 The Geothermal Steam Act of 197081 was such an event; after three years of
 preliminary efforts to formulate basic policy under the National Environmental
 Policy Act, regulations have just recently been adopted.82 Absent the impetus
 of a statute that cannot otherwise be administered (and an energy crisis which
 might be alleviated by the resources at issue), progress would be truly glacial.
 IV. A COMPLICATING FACTOR: BIFURCATION OF THE
 RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATORY FUNCTION
 A. The Board of Land Appeals
 The allocation of the interpretive function between rulemaking and
 adjudication is difficult enough under ordinary circumstances. This task has
 been complicated by the Department's creation of the Office of Hearings and
 Appeals as an independent body to perform the adjudicatory function, essen-
 tially free of secretarial or other department control, while rulemaking continues
 to be performed by the Department's operating divisions under the watchful
 eye of the Solicitor's Office. Formerly, the Solicitor's Office sat astride both
 the rulemaking and adjudicative aspects of interpretation, permitting rather
 tight and unified control over departmental policymaking. The Solicitor's Office
 retains substantial influence over rulemaking, coordinating and supervising
 efforts at the departmental level, and consequently is able to influence rule
 79. Hearings on Oil Shale Before the Sen. Comm. on the Interior and Insular Affairs,
 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1965).
 80. See McFarland, supra note 49, at 42. As he remarks, this is by no means a
 peculiarity of the administrative process.
 81. 30 U.S.C. ?? 1001-1025 (1970).
 82. Original draft proposals were published in the Federal Register in July, 1971,
 36 Fed. Reg. 13722-40. Revised proposals were published in November, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg.
 25282-313, and July, 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 19748-79, without any indication either of the
 changes made in the proposal or of the specific reasons for making them. Final regulations
 appeared in 38 Fed. Reg. 35068 (1973).
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 content significantly.83 It no longer exercises any decisional control, however,
 over litigation. The Department's adjudicatory law is now entirely committed
 to administrative law judges and administrative appeal bodies of the Office
 of Hearings and Appeals. One of those appellate tribunals, the Board of Land
 Appeals, is responsible for final decision in all cases involving disputes under
 the mining law.
 The Board of Land Appeals' internal proceduress8 do not seem well
 adapted to the role of making policy through adjudication. When appeal
 documents are complete, an administrative officer selects a panel of three
 members, making his selection on a random basis adjusted only for even
 distribution of workload or the occasional case in which the Director designates
 himself as a member of the panel. Oral argument is rare, limited to cases in
 which a request is made and even then a matter for discretion. Rather, the
 documents are sent to one of the designated panel members, and he and a staff
 assistant write an opinion in the case. No formal consultation with the other
 two members of the panel is provided for, and none usually occurs. A pre-
 decision conference will be held only if the opinion writer wishes it. The
 opinion, when complete, is sent to the other panel members with the supporting
 documents; they may propose changes, note their agreement, or prepare
 opposing opinions. Each opinion is circulated to all members of the Board for
 possible comment, dissent, or invocation of en bane consideration before release.
 Even in en bane cases, the same dry procedures may be followed.
 The problem here is that the Board's cloistered approach may lead, in the
 routine case, to unnecessary and even misleading opinions; in more important
 cases, to a failure to focus sharply on the matters in issue. Of course, appellate
 bodies, notably the federal courts of appeal, increasingly dispose of appeals
 without oral argument, as one means of dealing with the quickening pace of
 their business. But no court of appeals contemplates decision before argument
 where there is significant controversy or where the outcome will have any
 shaping impact upon the law; typically, the unargued appeals are those in which
 any opinion is cursory and designated for the dustbin-neither to be published
 nor relied upon in any future litigation involving different parties. But for
 the Board, the panel member who initially receives an appeal must write fully
 even if the case appears insignificant, since his colleagues' views are not yet
 known. Moreover, the Board neither identifies its uncontroversial holdings
 83. This function does not differ materially today from the description of the rule-
 making responsibilities of the Solicitor's office given by the Attorney General's Committee
 on Administrative Procedure in 1941. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE
 ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st
 Sess. 69-70 (1941).
 84. A brief description of the Board's operations by the first director of the Office
 of Hearings and Appeals appears in Day, Administrative Procedure in the Department
 of the Interior: The Role of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, 17 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
 INST. 1, 1-11 (1972).
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 with brief opinions and instructions not to publish or cite them, nor limits
 perfunctory, record-only review procedures to such cases; the opinions seem
 equally elaborate and the deliberative processes seem equally remote in all
 cases. If a case is cut-and-dry under departmental precedent and rules, oral
 argument is indeed a waste; but so is seriatim consideration, the writing of
 lengthy opinions, or any indication that those opinions may be significant for
 the Department's future business. It would be equally suitable, and fully
 sufficient against the possibility of judicial review, for the panel to agree after
 review of the record that no real controversy exists and to issue a judgment
 to that effect, adopting the findings and conclusions made below.
 Where significant controversy exists, on the other hand, the Board's
 policymaking responsibilities suggest that it should grant oral argument85
 rather than discourage it.86 Here, the dryness and remoteness of its procedures
 contrast sharply with the Board's authority to reformulate significant policy-
 without any institutionalized check beyond the possibilities of reconsideration
 or, more unlikely, secretarial review.87 Without oral argument and the initial
 collegiate consideration that it implies, the individual members of the panel
 never face the discipline of preparing for argument at a particular time; do
 not experience the sharpening focus of adversary presentation of central
 issues; and have little sense of post-consideration agreement regarding the
 simplicity or complexity of the issues presented. The infrequency of oral
 argument may encourage respondents not to file briefs on appeals, and lead
 the non-writing Board members-busy with their own work-to give some-
 what unfocused attention to the case. Collegiate consideration could produce
 both an accelerated pace of decision from filing to judgment and deeper, more
 sharply focused consideration where controversy is genuine.
 B. Secretarial Control over Board Decisions
 Particularly striking is the absence, even in cases in which significant
 policy questions are presented, of any explicit provision for secretarial control
 over the Board's policy conclusions to assure coherence and intelligibility in
 the Department's interpretive application of the mining laws. The Board, like
 the Office of Hearing and Appeals generally, was created in response to the
 pressure of criticism from the private bar that policy and adjudication functions
 in the Department were too closely linked; with its creation, division of func-
 85. Compare 43 C.F.R. ? 4.25 (1973) (Board of Land Appeals; oral argument
 discretionary), with 8 id. ? 3.1(d) (1-a, e) (Board of Immigration Appeals; oral argument
 mandatory on request unless appeal is frivolous or technically deficient).
 86. Oral argument is doubtless discouraged by the 1500-mile distance from where
 the Board sits to the nearest mining district or significant concentration of public lands,
 requiring at least one of the parties to hire local counsel or fly half the continent or more
 to attend. Relocation of the Board to one or more of the western law centers, a step
 apparently under consideration in the Department, would markedly alleviate this problem.
 87. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text infra.
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 tion became complete.88 Members of the Board, although typically drawn from
 within the Department, are almost completely isolated from contact with the
 rest of the Department once on the Board. Their offices are located in suburban
 Virginia, several miles from the main departmental complex in Washington,
 D.C. The point is strongly made in the Department's regulations that Govern-
 ment counsel appearing before the Board of Land Appeals "shall represent
 the Government agency in the same manner as a private advocate represents
 a client,"89 and that there shall be no oral or written ex parte communication
 between "any" party and a member of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
 concerning the merits of a proceeding.90 The result of these procedures is that
 departmental officials can argue policy matters-the desirability of overruling
 outdated or erroneous departmental precedent, for example-only through
 their briefs. The general operating divisions of the Department have no control
 over the outcome and cannot impose their policy preferences, except by previous
 adoption of a rule.91
 The isolation of the Bureau of Land Management, ostensibly the principal
 source of policy concerning mining matters, is particularly dramatic. Before
 creation of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, the Bureau played a decisive
 role in litigative as well as in legislative approaches. Provision for an inter-
 mediate appeal to its Director from the hearing examiner's decision permitted
 the Bureau a measure of policy control. The Bureau's function as intermediate
 appellate body was eliminated, however, because it was viewed as a source
 of oppressive delay and an example of the combined functions which the
 proponents of reform believed must be separated. The result was isolation of
 the Bureau from any contact with a case once a complaint had been made
 and answered (and, perhaps, evidence had been given by Bureau experts).
 While rules and Manual directives come into being through the Bureau's
 labyrinthine corridors, the prosecution of litigation is entirely in the hands
 of the Solicitor's Office; adjudication, with its policy overtones, belongs to the
 Office of Hearings and Appeals and its Board of Land Appeals. To the extent
 policy in mining matters is made by decision rather than rule, the higher levels
 of the Bureau no longer contribute significantly to its formulation.
 To be sure, the independence of the Board, like other tribunals of the
 Office of Hearings and Appeals, is not without formal limit; the Secretary
 retains his power of personal decision.9 The regulations, however, make no
 88. 35 Fed. Reg. 12081 (1970). The history and criticisms are briefly recounted in
 Day, supra note 84, at 1-8; see e.g., PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 253; McCarty,
 supra note 21, at 172-74.
 89. 43 C.F.R. ? 4.3(b) (1973).
 90. Id. ? 4.27(b).
 91. Although the issue has not been squarely tested, members of the Office of Hearings
 and Appeals feel they can disregard lesser policy statements, such as Manual directions
 and Solicitor's Opinions, if convinced of another interpretation.
 92. 43 C.F.R. ? 4.5 (1973).
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 formal provision for secretarial review; rather, they state that no departmental
 appeal will lie from a decision of an appeals board.93 Even if that provision,
 important to assure finality of administrative decision before judicial review is
 sought, were not seen to preclude a corrective, personal secretarial action, such
 intervention would be extraordinarily difficult as a political matter, flaunting
 the very pressures that led to creation of the Office; the Secretary could inter-
 vene only in the most urgent cases, if at all. In fact, the Secretary has not yet
 intervened, although departmental demands for rehearing have been frequent
 enough and the Solicitor's policy arguments have often been rejected by the
 Office.
 Certain informal lines of communication do exist-incursions, perhaps
 necessary ones, on the spirit if not the letter of the rule that the Department
 appears before the adjudicatory body "as a private advocate." Private com-
 munications between the Department and the Director of the Office, who does
 not ordinarily sit on appeals, have been quite free. While there is some debate
 whether he is ever approached on the merits of policy matters, the Director
 will be told if a particular matter is regarded as "important," and is occasionally
 asked either to have matters considered en banc or to place himself, ex officio,
 on the panel. The effect is to underscore the policy implications of the particular
 case. Communication exists as well in the opposite direction:94 departmental
 regulations or forms which by their obscurity have proved particularly pro-
 ductive of litigation are called to attention, sometimes with suggestions for
 changes that might produce greater clarity or otherwise reduce the litigative
 workload. And the opinions themselves, concrete examples of the Board's
 independence, may produce a somewhat greater incentive at higher levels in
 the Department to act by rule.
 The total picture, however, remains quite different from one's ordinary
 expectations about the choice between rulemaking and adjudication. Instead
 of a single decider, rationally or irrationally allocating choices between the two
 procedures and itself making the fundamental policy decisions whichever mode
 is chosen, one finds a frequently unconscious process of allocation and, more
 important, a process which leads ultimately to different authorities. Whatever
 its deficiencies as a maker of rules, the National Labor Relations Board which
 makes a rule is the same body as that which, encountering a troublesome point
 in litigation, announces a new departure in that format. For the Department
 93. Id. ? 4.21(c). Reconsideration or hearing en banc is provided for, and the filing
 of a motion to that end would permit the Secretary to intervene were he so inclined.
 94. Cf. Day, supra note 84, at 3-5, 23-24. It must be emphasized that the only sug-
 gestions made of contact between the Office and general operating divisions of the
 Department relate to matters of policy and interpretation; on questions of fact and of
 rule application, no basis whatever exists to suspect that the independence of the Office
 has been compromised. It would be surprising were there even an effort in that direction.
 But the point about policymaking by adjudication, which warrants the present excursus, is
 that it permits "judges" to announce decisions which could equally be made in a legislative
 format.
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 of the Interior, on the other hand, the procedural choice-rule, Manual,
 Solicitor's Opinion, or decision-determines the body which makes the policy
 decision as well as the format in which that decision appears. The effect is "to
 isolate the Secretary and others within the Department most concerned over
 policy from any feel for the impact of the flow of decisions on policy,"95 and
 to fragment the policy function.
 The Office of Hearings and Appeals and its Board of Land Appeals thus
 depart substantially from the considerations which underlay the recommenda-
 tion of the Administrative Conference in 1968, that agencies "having a
 substantial caseload of formal adjudications should consider the establishment
 of . . . intermediate appellate boards . . . with discretionary authority in the
 agency to affirm summarily or to review [their decisions] ... ."6 In the
 recommendation and, particularly, Professor Freedman's perceptive report
 underlying it,97 insistence on the mechanism of discretionary review makes
 plain that promoting coherence in agency policy formulation is central. Al-
 though reduction of delay, elimination of unwarranted litigation costs, and the
 possibly enhanced appearance of fairness resulting from removal of strictly
 routine adjudication to a body without significant overall policy responsibilities
 were also anticipated as benefits that would flow from creation of a separate
 appeals body, "the failure of the federal administrative agencies to achieve the
 formulation of coherent policy"98 was a focal concern.
 Professor Freedman suggested two possible models for such boards: (1)
 a "judicial" board limited to applying existing rules and precedents and re-
 quired to certify policy issues of first impression to the agency head; and (2)
 the "administrative" model-apparently rejected by the Conference in its rec-
 ommendation-in which a board conceded a role in formulating policy would
 be permitted to wield the full range of policymaking tools, rules as well as
 decisions, but would remain subject to formal, discretionary review at higher
 levels of the agency. While these models are neither polar nor exhaustive, the
 Board of Land Appeals lacks the significant features of both: unification of
 the policymaking function, and ultimate control, through discretionary review,
 in the agency's head. Although impartiality in the application of established
 95. Bloomenthal, supra note 21, at 257. The problem here is not significantly different
 from that often predicted in response to recommendations for radical separation of adju-
 dicatory and legislative functions in the major federal agencies. E.g., Loevinger, supra
 note 58; Robinson, supra note 4, at 485-86.
 96. 1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
 REPORTS, ACUS Rec. 68-6, at 20, 125 (1971); see also Statements of the Administrative
 Conference on the ABA Proposals to Amend the Administrative Procedure Act, 1972-
 1973 ANN. REP. 51 (1973).
 97. Freedman, Review Boards in the Administrative Process, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
 546 (1969).
 98. Id. at 547. It is hardly necessary to call again the roll of those have decried
 this failing. But transplantation of adjudicatory authority to an "independent" body has
 not usually been thought the cure. Cf. Robinson, On Reorganizing the Independent Regu-
 latory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REV. 947, 970 (1971).
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 rules is essential, it seems an arid concept of fairness that purchases indepen-
 dence of function at the cost of coherent policy. Creation of the Board has
 heightened the need to develop techniques for assuring coherence and intel-
 ligibility in the Department's interpretive application of the mining laws.
 C. An Illustration: "Discovery"
 These generalizations may be illustrated by a consideration of the prin-
 cipal criterion by which the Department tests the validity of mining claims
 under the General Mining Law, whether a "discovery" of a "valuable mineral
 deposit" has been made. The requirement of discovery of a valuable mineral is
 imposed, but left undefined, by sections 1 and 2 of the General Mining Law.9'
 Subsequent statutes, notably the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920100 and the
 Common Varieties Act of 1955,101 have limited somewhat the types of min-
 erals which may be considered "valuable"- coal, oil, and common sand and
 gravel, for example, may no longer be so considered-but have left unburdened
 by statutory provision such questions as how much ore, of what richness, must
 be found in the case of minerals which remain locatable. Any deposit of a
 "valuable mineral" no matter how weak the ore? Any "mineral deposit" which
 is "valuable" in the sense that the deposit could be sold in place, although it is
 not yet ripe for exploitation because richer ores remain available, technologies
 are undeveloped, or the like?102 A deposit which had greater value when
 found than it does at present, due to a change in market conditions?103 A
 deposit which reflects greater value than any other potential use for the land
 -say, for residential development or timber production?104 A marginal de-
 posit, but one found by a prospector, say, an established mining company,
 believed to have a good-faith mining purpose ?105
 The view sometimes articulated, that these undefined terms present ques-
 tions of law to be resolved through a judicial search for some fixed meaning,l06
 is untenable. When the Secretary or his delegate decides that discovery of a
 valuable mineral has been demonstrated, he issues a patent and the question
 of the claim's validity never reaches court; to that extent, final definitional
 power for the grant of patents and confirmation of claims has been placed
 with the administrator. Thus unable to fix the inner limit of meaning, a court
 can say only when the administrator has been too grudging. Realizing that it
 can rarely be called upon to say whether the Secretary has treated "discovery"
 99. 30 U.S.C. ?? 22-23 (1970).
 100. 30 U.S.C. ?? 181-287 (1970).
 101. 30 U.S.C. ? 611 (1970).
 102. See E.S. Larsen & Minerals Trust Corp., 9 I.B.L.A. 247 (1973).
 103. See Alvis F. Denison, 76 I.D. 233 (1969).
 104. See Thomas C. Wells, A-30805 (Jan. 8, 1968); United States v. Kosanke Sand
 Corp., 12 I.B.L.A. 282, 3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30017 (1973).
 105. See New Jersey Zinc Co., 74 I.D. 191 (1967).
 106. See, e.g., Reeves, The Origin and Developmzent of the Rules of Discovery,
 8 LAND & W.L. REV. 1 (1973).
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 as meaning too little, a court would be reluctant to conclude that he has con-
 strued it to require too much; one adjusts to the condition of hearing only
 one side of the argument. The Secretary has in fact been permitted substantial
 leeway in his definition of the statutory terms.107
 The definition of "discovery" of a "valuable mineral deposit," changing
 over the years, has clearly been the instrument of policy.108 In early years,
 when the Government's lands were still viewed as goods held for disposal,
 securing a patent was easy and quick. More attention was paid to the accuracy
 of the cadastral survey that fixed its location on the public land records, than
 to any mineral survey to determine whether or not minerals had in fact been
 found. With increasing awareness that remaining public lands were a trust
 to be managed for the benefit of all, rather than an incubus or financial asset to
 be disposed of, and with increasing sophistication in the available technology
 for processing mineral ores, mineral surveys became more careful, and the
 standards applied, more rigorous. Patent applications have been slowed to a
 trickle both by the tightening of standards and by adoption of the policy of
 declaring invalid any claim for which a patent application is denied.109
 The realization that lands ostensibly claimed for their mineral values
 were being used for residential development, timber production, summer homes,
 or long-term speculation, rather than developed as mineral properties, con-
 tributed as well to the tightening of the discovery standard. There were also
 practical administrative considerations: a rigorous, objective standard of dis-
 covery might appear more workable, less productive of expensive litigation
 and difficult questions of credibility or purpose, than a standard which sought
 to assess the element of good faith or mining purpose. The very age of the
 statute produced substantial strain; the statute lacks any express provision
 for ongoing regulation of claims,10 and so its definitional provisions have
 been made to serve functions for which supervisory measures might ordinarily
 be used. These functions, however, are at best imperfectly served, since the
 Department can only determine that a claim is or is not valid, not how it
 can best be developed consistent with other values.1l
 The current dispute over application of the discovery standard to oil shale
 is illustrative. This common mineral has long been seen as a rich potential
 107. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968); Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d
 200 (9th Cir. 1974).
 108. See the unusually forthright-and sound-statement in Hochmuth, Government
 Administration and Attitudes in Contest and Patent Proceedings, 10 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
 INST. 467 (1965). See also Note, Government Initiated Contests Against Mining Claimls-
 A Continuing Conflict, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 102, 129-35; NONFUEL MINERALS, supra note
 12, at 390-410, 419-20. In its most recent pronouncements, however, the Board has taken
 a rather limited view of the policymaking inherent in the process of definition. Kosanke
 Sand Corp., 12 I.B.L.A. 282, 3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30019-21 (1973); United States
 v. Winegar, 4 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30005 (1974).
 109. See note 15 supra.
 110. See note 68 supra.
 111. Kosanke Sand Corp., 12 I.B.L.A. 282, 3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30017, 30019-21 (1973).
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 source of petroleum products and, prior to enactment of the Mineral Leasing
 Act of 1920,112 was subject to the mining laws. Under the Department's usual
 discovery standards, such claims could not qualify for patent, however, for the
 shale had no immediate commercial use. In a striking example of the flexibility
 with which the statute has been interpreted to achieve desirable objectives,
 the Department adopted-first by Solicitor's Opinion113 and then case deci-
 sionl14-a different standard of discovery for oil shale. To further the policy
 of fostering the development of this enormous energy resource, the Depart-
 ment abandoned the requirement that current value be established. The desired
 development, however, did not occur. But since the discovery standard change
 favored claimants rather than limited their assertions, a judicial test of its
 correctness was at best unlikely.115 Now, fifty years later, the pre-1920 claims
 continue to be asserted"6 and if valid may result in development much less
 carefully constrained than is likely to occur under the Department's recently
 adopted leasing program.l7 In a major reexamination of the issue, the Board
 of Land Appeals rejected the differential standard of discovery for oil shale
 as "clearly contrary to the mining law,"118 and determined that no qualifying
 discovery of a valuable mineral can be made without a showing of "present
 value."119
 Throughout the development of its discovery standards, the Depart-
 ment never attempted to state its construction in rule form. True, lengthy
 descriptions of "discovery" and "valuable mineral deposit" have been produced
 for the Bureau Manual-a format which ostensibly controls mineral exam-
 inations and the formulation of complaints and exercises substantial, if dinin-
 ishing, influence over Department attorneys and adjudicators. And reading
 these formulations suggests some rather fine policy differentiations: ores of
 112. 30 U.S.C. ?? 181-287 (1970). The Act required future interests in shale-rich
 lands to be acquired by lease, id. ? 241, but saved-under conditions not important here,
 see Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970)-existing valid claims, 30 U.S.C.
 ? 193 (1970).
 113. Instructions, 47 I.D. 458 (1920).
 114. Freeman v. Summers, 52 I.D. 201 (1927).
 115. No such test could have been brought by a public official. Sec text accompanying
 note 106 supra. Freeman v. Summers, 52 I.D. 201 (1927), was a private contest between
 Summers, an applicant for a homestead, and Freeman, asserting the discovery of oil shale.
 Summers was entitled to prevail only if the lands were not valuable for mineral exploita-
 tion. He lost because, under the then prevailing interpretation, they were found to have
 that value. The private contest setting made it theoretically possible that judicial review
 could have been obtained-if homesteader Summers were able to come to Washington
 (then the only possible venue for suits seeking relief from Department decisions) for the
 purpose, and assuming also that service over Freeman and his compatriots could be had
 there or that they would not have been considered indispensable parties. Sec C. MCFAR-
 LAND, supra note 11, at 186-87, 223-24 nn. 267-70. Not surprisingly, review was not in
 fact sought.
 116. See Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970), on remand, 370 F. Supp. 108
 (D. Colo. 1973).
 117. See 38 Fed Reg. 33186 (1973) (prototype leasing program).
 118. United States v. Winegar, 16 I.B.L.A. 112, 4 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30005, 30016
 (1974).
 119. Id.
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 valuable metals, such as copper or gold, are said not to require the same show-
 ing of present marketability as commoner minerals, such as limestone; for
 forested land, a mineral deposit must be so "valuable" that its exploitation
 is clearly the highest and best use of the land. But the standards lack force
 as a declaration of departmental or Bureau policy. Strikingly, they are not
 presented simply as statutory interpretations grounded in policy consider-
 ations; rather, each is supported by reference to numerous prior adjudications.
 To be sure, these decisions were rendered when insouciance about separation
 of functions permitted them to be made by persons in the main stream of
 administration; the Manual standards themselves were adopted after the ex-
 cruciating bureaucratic procedures described above.'20 Yet the effect of the
 citation format is to suggest that the standards are no more than a digest of
 the Department's case law. Consequently, they may be disregarded, treated as
 a secondary source if a rereading of the cases or analysis of subsequent cases
 suggests a different synthesis. In fact, that has been the fate of the Manual
 definitions. Unrevised in seventeen years, they are ignored.
 Government officials who must apply the discovery standard in their
 work are well aware of its flexibility and policy implications, and use that
 flexibility within the limits imposed on them by staff review or current case
 law to achieve what appears to them to be useful change. Thus, a mineral
 valuation expert bases his recommendations for contesting claims on his belief
 about what the discovery standard ought to become as well as upon his under-
 standing of what it is; should there be a hearing, he will work closely with
 the attorney assigned to the case, try to persuade him to his theory, and
 give the testimony necessary to frame the case. His recommendations are
 supervised for conformity to Bureau policy, but supervision is undertaken
 by a colleague working in the same office, who is busy with other matters
 and permits a fair amount of initiative if only to maintain morale. The expert
 would not think of provoking a legislative type of process because that route
 is too impersonal and clogged with obstacles. Case work, on the other hand,
 involves dealing with a few well-known individuals, not a huge bureaucratic
 machine, it generally involves relations with peers or near-peers, not a be-
 littling chain of command. The case is a nlatter of individual responsibility;
 one takes it as far as one can, then trusts it to the winds. A prototype rule
 cannot easily be so regarded.l21
 120. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
 121. Hochmuth, supra note 108. This possibility of individual initiative contributes
 to the prospector's fear of arbitrariness, as eloquently remarked by a Denver attorney:
 The antiquity of the General Mining Law makes it less acceptable to staff in
 the field than it might once have been; today's.mineral examiner or field attorney
 is offended by the notion of J. Jones getting 160 valuable acres virtually for free,
 and the ghost of Albert Fall [Secretary of the Interior during the "Teapot Dome"
 scandal], still stalking the Department's corridors, reinforces his disposition to
 resist. A tradition of decision by adjudication, in these circumstances, may permit
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 The consequences of fractionating the policymaking function within the
 Department have begun to appear. Whether in expressing skepticism that
 they can be bound by Solicitor's Opinions or in making subtle changes in the
 discovery concept which seem to ease the most demanding of the recent
 interpretations,122 the members of the Board of Land Appeals assert an
 independence of other departmental policymakers which is at the same time
 intended and productive of possibly destructive antagonisms.123 Should the
 Board recant the existing policies on discovery, and as a result order issuance
 of a patent where none would have been granted before, no court will be called
 upon to judge whether it has interpreted "discovery" too permissively. Internal
 check of an unacceptable decision is possible, but only at the cost of destroying
 both the finality of the Board's decision and the appearance of impartiality
 which has been so emphatically sought after.
 Permitting policymaking to continue as a predominantly adjudicatory
 matter under the present institutional arrangements assures a loss of control.
 The issue is not simply whether adjudication or rulemaking is the more
 suitable procedure to formulate policy, but who is to decide the policy question.
 The operating divisions of the Department have a necessary and, indeed,
 proper interest in having some assurance that the outcome of adjudication will
 conform to the policies of the Department generally; they naturally want and,
 they contend, ought to have more than a litigant's say. The Secretary's position
 vis-a-vis that office is not that of a coordinate and coequal branch. To the extent
 that it is not merely applying existing rules to disputed facts, the Board of
 Land Appeals cannot be insulated and impartial in its function without raising
 some risk of prejudice to the Government's proper interests in its lands. The
 interest in coherence cannot be wholly disregarded. If a concern for fairness
 to private litigants compels the insulation of the Board of Land Appeals from
 secretarial policy control, the Secretary must have some other forum in which
 to assert that a legal or, less likely, factual conclusion of the Board contravenes
 departmental policy.
 V. RATIONALIZATION OF THE POLICYMAKING FUNCTION
 Whether an independent board to decide administrative appeals is a
 sensible institution is, itself, an interesting question. Both the Public Land
 Law Review Commission and its reporter on procedural matters, Professor
 McFarland, recognized the divided administrative responsibilities which.
 efforts to develop new policy; my fear is that in a setting of marginal super-
 vision, no one will get a claim if it can be helped.
 See Carver, Administrative Law and Public Land Management, 18 A.B.A. ADMIN. L.
 REV. 7, 14-15 (1965).
 122. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968); cf. Kosanke Sand Corp., 12
 I.B.L.A. 282, 3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30017, 30019-21 (1973).
 123. Letter from General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture to Administrative
 Conference of U.S., May 28, 1974, at 1, 4, on file at Administrative Conference of U.S.
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 would attend any independent review board; but both also stressed the public
 apprehension that disinterested justice could not be obtained, as possibly
 warranting steps in that direction.124 As has also been apparent in more general
 studies of the problem,125 the two considerations are not readily reconciled.
 Once the existence of the Board is assumed, however, the question becomes
 how to minimize the division in policy function.
 A. Mandatory Curbs on Adjudication
 The Public Land Law Review Commission's recommendation, already
 noted,126 was that the Department be prohibited from applying any standard
 or interpretation not previously embodied in a statute or departmental regula-
 tion against the interests of a party, and be required to make all changes in
 policy through the medium of rulemaking.127 This restriction of policy formu-
 lation to rulemaking responds directly both to uniform critical comment and
 to the bifurcated policy structure now established within the Department ;128 the
 restriction has the apparent support of the American Bar Association as
 well.'29 What in effect is intended is a limitation of adjudicatory function to
 fact-finding and rule-application. But the judicial function can not be so
 limited-or, as Hamilton put the complementary proposition, rules must
 leave room for accommodating to circumstances, which cannot, before-
 hand, be accurately appreciated, and for varying the course of
 proceeding, as experience shall suggest to be proper, and . . . avoid
 the danger of those obstructions and embarrassments . . . to be ap-
 prehended from an endeavor at greater precision and more exact
 detail.l30
 The question is how complex or detailed a skeleton can be described in advance,
 how narrow the gaps can properly be made. Even with the most comprehensive
 "legislative" scheme, judicial application inevitably "makes" new law.
 Nor is it clear that a requirement that all policy formulation be conducted
 through rules would amount to anything more than unenforceable suasion.
 The occasional requirement of regulations under public lands statutes has
 produced only an uninformative rehash of the statutes. Nor could it be expected
 124. PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 254; C. McFARLAND, supra note 11, at 302-04.
 125. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 4; Robinson, supra note 98; Freedman, supra
 note 97.
 126. See notes 5-9 and accompanying text supra.
 127. The Commission's recommendation was embodied in a House bill, which was
 never enacted. H.R. 7211, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. ? 6(g) (1971); see note 7 supra.
 128. See, e.g., PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 251-52; cf. Professor Freedman's
 "judicial" model of an appellate board, in which the board would be required to certify to
 the agency head any questions of first impression. Freedman, supra note 97, at 559.
 Similarly, under the Commission's proposed statute, the Board of Land Appeals would
 apparently be incapacitated to decide any issue other than the need for regulatory
 guidance, where it could not find an answer in existing law.
 129. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, adopted July,
 1971, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 72, at 380.
 130. 28 Am. State Papers (Public lands, I) 8-9 (1832), quoted in C. MCFARLAND,
 supra note 11, at 132.
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 that these unhelpful rules would be held insufficient, for the wholesale disposi-
 tions that might flow from an administrative or judicial decision that the
 Department had failed to adopt the rules necessary to limit private claims
 would be simply unacceptable.131
 If one cannot effectively command the Department to make all policy in
 advance of its application, through rulemaking, would it be possible to force
 rulemaking by requiring the obverse-that no policy may be made by the
 process of adjudication? Of course, any given decision may involve unforeseen
 circumstances and hence new law. But to recognize that fact of life does not
 imply that the decision in one case must be made conclusive or even especially
 forceful should the question arise again. Adjudicators, and those who argue to
 them, could be forbidden from regarding prior decisions in similar cases as
 "precedents" governing the particular case before them. In a caricature of the
 continental lawyer's approach to a civil code, a statute or rule could state that
 only statutes and regulations would be recognized as "authority."
 In the abstract, one might believe such a system good discipline for the
 agency concerned and productive of the simplified body of law that seems
 essential in a field characterized by small claims prosecuted by men of limited
 resources. But the reality of such a system would offend traditions and habits
 of legal practice. Any lacuna would become an occasion for unchanneled
 discretion; forbidden to seek consistency in its adjudications regarding any
 matter left unresolved by its rules, an agency could hardly be required to
 explain departures from prior results. This uncertainty might fuel the rule-
 making process, but it would also prove intolerable in any matter requiring
 investment or other reliance on an existing legal state of affairs. Inevitably,
 courts would become more deeply embroiled in telling agencies what their
 statutes and rules mean-since courts would not be forbidden the precedential
 process-than they need be with a doctrine that permits them some confidence
 in, and enables them to enforce, the consistency of agency interpretations.132
 All else aside, the intended discipline could not be expected to work. Adjudi-
 cators could not easily be kept from remembering what they had written
 yesterday and believing that today's labors would be shortened were they able
 to crib some of that reasoning. Nor could lawyers be kept from more or less
 subtle reminders. Case names might disappear from adjudicatory opinions,
 but form paragraphs would likely continue in their place.
 B. Reform of Internal Rulemaking Procedures
 The Department, then, cannot be required to decide on the basis only
 of rules adopted in advance of dispute; nor, realistically, can it be required to
 abjure administrative precedent in cases where rules are lacking or unclear.
 131. See C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 308; Bloomenthal, supra note 21, at 248.
 132. Cf. Robinson, supra note 98, at 970.
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 Perhaps the present bifurcation of authority represented by the Office of
 Hearings and Appeals will encourage greater use of legislative forms of policy-
 making, although no evidence of such an effect has yet appeared. The Bureau,
 in particular, will be properly concerned to reassert its policy control, and
 rulemaking is now the only means available to it. Might further steps be taken ?
 The most important reform of the Department's internal rulemaking
 procedures would be to eliminate the bureaucratic obstacles that presently
 hamper quasi-legislative action. Checks against hasty or unwise measures are
 obviously required; but the Department's and the Bureau's rulemaking pro-
 cedures travel far past the point where checks become obstacles. Participation
 in rulemaking must become more like participation in case adjudication-a
 process in which an individual can play an important and formative role.
 Speaking to this point, Professor McFarland133 uses as a model the practice of
 the Treasury Department; he suggests that the Department or the Bureau, or
 both, establish a special office particularly concerned with stating policy in
 regulation form, rather than permit each part of the bureaucracy to deal with
 rulemaking as one of its several responsibilities.l34
 Creation of a new office not only would require more of a commitment
 from Congress (in the form of appropriations) than the piety of an edict to
 act only by rule, it could be effective only if it resulted in an overall reduction
 of the number of persons concerned with rule formulation, so that drafts do
 not drift back and forth along a chain of command. A single authority, to
 which field staff might address suggestions and realistically expect prompt
 action to be taken on them, might bring them closer to the rulemaking process.
 Drafting preliminary to proposed rulemaking should imitate rulemaking pro-
 cedures, albeit within the Department: circulation of a proposal to all levels at
 once, with an opportunity for comment and, in appropriate cases, consultation,
 rather than serial drafting and revision across a series of desks. Nor does it
 seem essential that all policy disputes be resolved, all bases touched, before
 publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register. Existing practice
 not only contributes to the congestion in rulemaking, but also makes the public
 aspects of the procedure considerably less important; in particular, outsiders
 who are privately consulted in advance may achieve disproportionate influ-
 ence.135 The Department should view proposed rules more as exposure of a
 prototype than as a final test run of a fully designed and evaluated vehicle,
 leaving the formative consultation and negotiation to the notice-and-comment
 period.
 A related measure would be to recognize in the Office of Hearings and
 133. C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 309-10.
 134. This recommendation was emphatically repeated by the Public Land Law Review
 Commission, PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 251-52, but was not carried forward into
 H.R. 7211, supra note 127.
 135. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
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 Appeals formal authority to initiate a rulemaking process whenever it concludes
 that existing legislative guides-as distinct from its own decisions-accomplish
 less than is reasonably possible in setting out departmental policy. Any unified
 agency can so act when it confronts in litigation an unresolved issue which
 would be more profitably handled by rule.136 The Office presently calls such
 situations to the Secretary's attention informally; formal authority to call upon
 him to issue proposed rules where a need could be shown might emphasize a
 departmental commitment to a greater use of its rulemaking authority.137
 Professor Freedman incorporates a variation of this suggestion in his "ad-
 ministrative" model of an intermediate appeals board, which may draft proposed
 rules for publication in the Federal Register on matters appearing to require
 such definition.138 Any measure conferring authority to draft proposed rules
 on the Office of Hearings and Appeals, however, would reunify the policy-
 making apparatus at the risk of further isolation of the operating divisions of
 the Department. More fundamentally, creating such authority would not in
 itself give the Office major incentive to use it in favor of the more familiar
 and less time-consuming and cumbersome techniques of adjudication; it has
 not been for want of critical voices that the latter has been preferred.
 Incentives to action come from outside the Department-now, in the
 form of the case that must be decided-and the problem is to identify a similar
 drive for rulemaking. Might it be generated by permitting the insufficiency
 of existing rules to become an issue in pending litigation, or, indeed, by
 expanding the current bare privilege of petitioning for rulemakingl39 into a
 procedure, as if for administrative declaratory judgment, for determining
 whether and how existing rules might be made more precise? On the one
 hand, the Secretary cannot be required to dispense the enormously valuable
 public assets entrusted to him, as the bill discussed above would have done,140
 merely because his rules regarding the conditions on which those assets might
 be obtained are not sufficiently articulate; on the other, a broad and apparently
 well-founded consensus exists that those rules are both obscure and evanescent,
 to a degree that makes legal counseling needlessly complex and impairs legiti-
 mate planning.141 A procedure by which interested parties could force an
 effort at definition, however imperfect or infrequently used, might provide the
 now-absent pressure, but the need for clarification or redefinition of statutory
 136. Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763-64 (1969) (opinion of
 Fortas, J.).
 137. Cf. K. DAVIS, supra note-37, ? 6.13. Part of any request for policy clarification
 should be a demonstration that more precise guidelines are possible. Irreducible mysteries,
 such as "negligence," presumably could remain in the rules.
 138. Freedman, supra note 97, at 559; see text accompanying note 97 supra.
 139. 43 C.F.R. ? 14.1 (1973).
 140. See note 127 supra.
 141. Commissioner Loevinger, however, argues forcefully that the imprecision of
 existing rules is the source of an administrator's power and, consequently, is seen by him
 as an asset to be defended rather than an imperfection he can be enlisted to help curb.
 Loevinger, supra note 58, at 380. A dour view, but not an unpersuasive one.
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 terms and existing rules should not provide an occasion for permitting private
 claimants to prevail where their claims otherwise would have failed.
 Alternatively, the Board of Land Appeals might develop and use some
 of the techniques courts sometimes employ to provoke legislative clarification:
 "If X is what is meant, against the important interests of a private person, it
 must be more clearly stated in the governing law."142 But larger reasons
 often lurk behind the judicial uses of this device, which has not always catalyzed
 legislative action or been intended to do so. The bromide that a document is
 to be construed against its drafter, when applied to statute or rule rather than
 a contract drawn by the parties to the dispute for application to the particular
 occasion, has but limited validity. Save in special circumstances such as criminal
 law, where notice and clarity are considered particularly important, legislative
 documents are ordinarily construed with an eye to good sense and "intended"
 meaning, not against the party responsible for drafting them. Only a dramatic
 failure to forge rules out of demonstrably malleable material, if any failure at
 all, could warrant compelling recognition of private right in government
 property on that account alone.
 C. Controls over Decisions of the Board of Land Appeals
 A final series of measures possible to minimize the division in policy
 function involve provision for secretarial control over the policymaking dimen-
 sion of adjudication. A small but important first step, to avoid any possible
 confusion among lawyers or conflicts within the Department, would be to
 have the regulations establishing the Office of Hearings and Appeals include
 a statement of the laws by which it is governed, and a clarification of the
 precedential force of Board decisions. One of the occasional characteristics of
 common law litigation about statutes is that exegesis of prior judicial reasoning
 overtakes the text; some have thought the Department particularly prone to
 this development.143 Impractical as it may be to seek to strip the Board's
 decisions of all precedential force, some function might be served by a provision,
 in the manner of occasional codifications, that its prior constructions of the
 Department's statutes and rules are authoritative only to the extent they
 remain consistent with current departmental policies and approaches. The
 changes which have occurred in the Department's reading of its governing
 statutes-say, the discovery standard-are and should be seen as the product
 of changing policy, not the deposit of quasi-judicial decisions as such.
 Larger, institutional steps are also possible. One would be adoption for
 use by the Board of a hybrid procedure requiring it to certify important policy
 issues for secretarial decision after public notice and an opportunity for com-
 142. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
 143. Comipare C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 308, with Kosanke Sand Corp., 12
 I.B.L.A. 282, 3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30017 (1973).
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 ment, reserving for the Board's own decision the question of applying the
 policy then adopted to the particular case. Alternatively, provision could be
 made for discretionary secretarial review, the reactive approach which seems
 to have been anticipated by the Conference and the ABA in their recommen-
 dations for creation of intermediate appellate bodies.144 Or, the Secretary,
 through the issuance of Solicitor's Opinions, involving neither the formulation
 of policy nor reversal of its application in the particular case, could voice
 disapproval of particular Board decisions, leaving the policy question unsettled
 for future cases. Finally, the Board's holdings could be given maximum effect
 while retaining secretarial control over policy formulation if the Secretary
 were authorized to seek, and be bound by, judicial review of adverse holdings
 -as, for example, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may seek review of
 Tax Court decisions.145
 A provision for discretionary secretarial review would be the most
 orthodox response. Models can be found in the various executive departments
 as well as in the multi-member independent agencies that were the apparent
 focus of the Bar Association and Administrative Conference recommenda-
 tions.146 But a three-level tier of administrative decision involves elements of
 possible unfairness to private litigants, particularly if, as in the Department's
 public land matters, their capacity to support the expense of litigation is often
 marginal. The Department's elimination of the appeal to the Director of the
 Bureau, previously an intermediate step to final departmental decision, was
 itself made in recognition of possible unfairness worked by the costs of a multi-
 stage procedure. Where the issue is merely unifying the policymaking function,
 the justification for imposing the risks and expense of additional proceedings
 entirely on particular litigants is open to doubt.147
 The Solicitor's Opinion offers a vehicle less costly to individual litigants
 for blunting the force of unacceptable appellate board decisions. Just as the
 Internal Revenue Service announces its acquiescence or occasional nonacqui-
 escence in decisions of the Tax Court, the Solicitor's Office might be authorized
 by the Secretary to announce reasoned disagreement with decisions of the
 Board of Land Appeals. That opinion, obviously, would not affect the outcome
 of the particular case. But it could be given the effect of removing precedential
 force from the decision disapproved, subjecting the issue involved to redetermi-
 nation either in ensuing litigation or by rule. The rejection of the Board of
 Land Appeals' prior decision, together with the reasons stated for rejecting
 it, might have forceful effect should the Board again be called upon to resolve
 144. See note 96 suzpra.
 145. Cf. 26 U.S.C. ? 7483 (1964) (Tax Court); S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United
 States, 406 U.S. 1, 60-68 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
 146. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. ? 3.1(h) (1973) (Attorney General may review decisions of
 the Board of Immigration Appeals sua sponte or at the behest of the Board or the
 Commission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service).
 147. Cf. Kosanke Sand Corp., 12 I.B.L.A. 282, 3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30017 (1973).
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 the issue; as a published document, the Solicitor's Opinion would be available
 to both sides for citation in the case and doubtless would be cited. The appellate
 board, however, would again remain formally free to make its own reading of
 the issue presented.
 The judicial model, indeed, has its flaws when adapted to the administra-
 tive context. But if the Department feels compelled to grant court-like
 independence to the Board of Land Appeals, giving up centralized policy
 control, it mlight also assert that the judicial model of appeal by either side
 should apply. It is hard to escape the thought that the Department's Solicitor
 might wish equal redress for his "grievances" as any private party.148 And
 in some cases, notably those involving Forest Service lands, neither litigator
 before the Board has any formal connection with the Department of the
 Interior. The Forest Service, in pursuit of its own statutory and regulatory
 mandates to manage its lands efficiently, may come to believe that the Board
 (or, through it, the Department of the Interior) has failed to recognize some
 special factor, misread the governing statutes, or encumbered Forest Service
 lands without substantial evidence in support; judicial review at its behest
 would be one means, and perhaps the fairest to all parties concerned, for
 resolving the dispute.
 This last possibility is perhaps unlikely.149 It would require statutory
 148. It is not inconceivable that private claimants would be benefited thereby. Their
 prevailing complaint is that the Department remains too conservative regarding recognition
 of claims-that the ghost of Albert Fall still stalks the corridors, rendering departmental
 bureaucrats unwilling to recognize private claims of right. The unreviewability of decisions
 to recognize claims must (and on the evidence of informal discussions does) influence
 decision; an erroneous denial can always be reviewed, but not an erroneous grant, and
 hence it is safer to deny in cases of doubt. The Board of Land Appeals might be led to
 greater evenhandedness in managing its doubts if assured that both parties appearing be-
 fore it had an olportunity to correct its errors.
 Yet more speculative is the possibility that reviewing courts, faced with contentions
 that the Board had been too solicitous of private claims or not solicitous enough, would
 acquire a more balanced view of the Board's decisional processes. When court decisions
 speak of the limited nature of judicial review, they perhaps already recognize and adjust
 for the negative posture of suits seeking to overturn agency denials of private claims.
 As cases asserting insufficient agency aggressiveness have slowly begun to appear, the
 courts entertaining them have voiced perceptions of a "new era" in judicial-administrative
 relations. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckleshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597
 (D.C. Cir. 1971). What seems to be involved is the recognition that the consistently
 negative character of traditional provisions for review, responding only to private asser-
 tions that the agency had gone "too far" in encroaching on private rights, tended to foster
 timidity in regulation by the agency; it had to fear judicial assault only on one front,
 and the courts, too, because accustomed only to that limited perspective, rarely encountered
 allegations of administrative lassitude or over-permissiveness. So far as the Department
 is concerned, however, there is no indication that in recent years judicial control has
 been a significant factor; final reversals of its actions have been quite rare.
 149. But see Department of Agriculture Letter, supra note 123, at 2. This approach,
 while unlikely to be adopted, should be able to overcome any constitutional difficulties. The
 obvious difficulties regarding the existence of a constitutional case or controversy, less
 severe for the Forest Service, could be avoided if the Board were given independent status
 by statute, cf. 26 U.S.C. ?? 7441, 7483 (1964) (U.S. Tax Court), or if the Department
 would merely repudiate the unacceptable internal holding and await private suit.
 Nor should considerations of fairness to private litigants bar this approach. True,
 the Supreme Court in S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 '(1973),
 rejected non-statutory arguments for Government-initiated review of the findings of an
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 authorization, and the more broadly sweeping substantive reforms now pro-
 posed would moot the problem. Agencies are not courts, and for a variety of
 reasons should be left to resolve such disputes through the internal mechanisms
 of the Executive Branch-within the Department, through the Secretary;
 between the Department and outsiders such as the Forest Service, through
 the Office of Management and Budget, informal negotiation, or the President
 himself. Lapses by the Board may offer encouragement to rulemaking, and the
 Government's interest in the particular land affected by arguable error is not
 usually so great as to render the other possibilities suggested inadequate, nor
 is the incidence of internal or interdepartmental disputes regarding the cor-
 rectness of the Board's decisions now substantial. Yet the absence of a judicial
 remedy when disputed issues of law are resolved against the position of the
 Government's attorneys appearing before the Board should stand as a caution
 against excessive insulation of the Board from the rest of the Department's
 policy-setting apparatus.
 The better course might be steps in the direction of hybrid procedures,
 introducing elements of rulemaking into those cases in which large issues of
 interpretation, unresolved or imperfectly dealt with in the Department's rules,
 appear. Hybrid procedures seem to be most frequently viewed as a mode for
 increasing the discipline of rulemaking proceedings, but as some have sug-
 gested,15? they are equally apt for expanding the scope of adjudication when
 an issue of general importance is found to be involved in pending litigation.
 Published notice of the problem posed and a proposed ruling with opportunity
 for public comment would avoid the problems of inadequate public participation
 and representation which critics have noted in the past,151 and possibly ease
 the financial burden for the individual respondent. Incorporation of the result
 of this notice-and-comment proceeding in the Department's rules as well as
 its reported decisions would tend to simplify the presently over-complex task
 of finding its governing law. The Department, not formally subject to the
 Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking or adjudicatory procedures,152
 analogous independent adjudicatory body within the Atomic Energy Commission. There
 the majority, over a strong dissent, protested sharply what it deemed the unfairness of
 requiring a litigant, successful before the AEC, to run the further "gantlet" of "review"
 by other agencies (the General Accounting Office and the Justice Department) as a
 prelude to those agencies precipitating judicial review on behalf of the United States.
 Id. at 14-15. The majority found both the administrative "review" by the other agencies
 and judicial review at the request of the United States to be unauthorized by statute. Had
 the statute been explicit, however, nothing suggests the Court would have found a
 constitutional barrier to the procedure. And the assessment that forcing the litigant to
 run the further gantlet is "unfair" blinks the deliberate effort to make the board whose
 decision is thus appealed "independent" of agency influence, itself in the interests of
 fairness. One cannot have it both ways.
 150. E.g., Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication--Rulemaking: Some Recent Devel-
 opiments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 83. Cf. 2 ADMINISTRATIVE
 CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, ACUS Rec. 71-3,
 at 24, 175-80 (1973).
 151. See text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
 152. The statute does not formally require a hearing. Those aspects of the Act's
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 is in a particularly favorable position to undertake procedural experimentation
 of this sort.
 Such procedures would be more appropriate at the Board level than
 before the Department's administrative law judges. Awaiting appeal permits
 a more accurate assessment of the importance of the issues, and the record
 compiled at the initial hearing should both illustrate the ambiguity or insuffi-
 ciency of existing policy guides and afford a basis for resolution of the
 immediate controversy. The suggestion is that the Board be empowered, either
 on motion of a party or sua sponte, to publish in the Federal Register notice
 of policy issues thus framed and of their suggested resolution. The suggested
 resolution might be the Board's, but use of the Departmental Solicitor's position
 would reflect the Secretary's proper hegemony over policy issues. Notice-and-
 comment rulemaking would ensue. Once all comments had been received, final
 decision of the policy issue (but not its application to the particular case)
 should be possible, at least formally, at the secretarial level; in any event, the
 less confining strictures of rulemaking processes would apply. Application of
 the policy in the particular case, however, or decision of the case without
 secretarial input, should legislative statement prove infeasible or unnecessary,
 would be left to the Board's present adjudicatory processes.
 Adoption of such a procedure undoubtedly would stir arguments regarding
 the "prospective" application of rules and permissible "retroactivity" of adjudi-
 cation. The claim would be that, having infected the adjudicatory process with
 general public participation and open consideration of concededly unresolved
 policy issues, the Department could no longer fairly apply the result of its
 proceedings to the case at hand. As Professor Robinson has convincingly
 shown, however, the prospectivity-retroactivity distinction, like other formal
 differences between rulemaking and adjudication, has been considerably
 overdrawn.'53 If properly subject to the possibility that his rights would be
 determined by adjudication, a claimant suffers no discernible injury from the
 choice of a slightly different, fair and yet more catholic procedure to investigate
 the policy questions involved. At most, he is entitled to an opportunity-such
 as he would have in the strictly adjudicatory context as well-to show equitable
 bases for a claim not to have the new standards applied to his detriment: for
 example, that prior law, upon which he properly relied, was clearly in his
 favor; that past events, in particular, should not be judged by a standard clearly
 different from that which seemed to govern at the time; or the like.154 Where
 adjudicatory procedures which can be linked to considerations of constitutional due process
 have been acknowledged to apply to the Department. See Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29,
 32-33 (9th Cir. 1958). But if procedures adequate to meet the demands of fairness are
 assumed, the Department is relatively free of formal constraints.
 153. Robinson, supra note 4, at 517-19; see also Shapiro, supra note 4, at 933, 952-57.
 154. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (denial of retroactive effect to
 new constitutional understanding). Cf. Robinson, supra note 4, at 525-26; Shapiro, supra
 note 4, at 952; Massey Motors v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 108 (1960) (Harlan, J.,
 dissenting); K. DAVIs, supra note 37, ? 5.09. The common perception that the Department
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 prior law has been uncertain, or the question is what future showing must be
 made or conduct performed with respect to existing claims, such equitable
 bases could not be established, and full application of the determination made
 in the hybrid proceedings to all claims would be entirely justified. The common
 practice under regulatory statutes such as the Mineral Leasing Act is to
 include in the lease agreement an undertaking to be bound by future changes
 in governing regulations; so here. In the context of a claim to government
 property gratuitously made available to private interests, not private property
 subjected to outside control, the citizen's claim to "non-retroactivity" is fairly
 limited to the avoidance of adverse consequences from behavior apparently
 lawful when undertaken-without regard to the character of the proceedings
 in which the rules governing his obligation are eventually defined. While
 existing claims obviously could not be abrogated by fiat, neither Congress nor
 the Department lacks authority to clarify governing law or to alter for the
 future the circumstances under which the claims are held.
 CONCLUSION
 The search for mandatory controls over the allocation of the policymaking
 function between rulemaking and adjudication remains illusory. The legislative
 recommendations of the Public Land Law Review Commission were wisely left
 to wither by Congress, and the Supreme Court, with equal wisdom one might
 believe, refused to endorse judicial controls. The case could be made that the
 issue of allocation is a "straw man"-that the only outcome-determining issue
 will be the fairness of retroactive application of new "law" in the adjudicatory
 context. The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.155
 teaches us that the retroactivity problem does not exclude the creative use of
 ostensibly adjudicative technique.'56 Yet whether or not controls are applied,
 there remains a body of belief that for some purposes rules are the superior
 has failed to recognize just reliance claims is one of the most fertile sources of discontent
 within the private bar regarding its administration of the mining law. The Department
 must remain free to change its interpretation of governing law when a previous position
 appears to have been in error, with adverse consequences for the future expectations even
 of those who acquired benefits under the prior rule. Absent such authority, venal or
 shallow administrators could too easily commit valuable resources to perpetual waste. No
 contemporary corrective is available to the Government. But it does not follow that
 the interpretation in question may be given no force for the period during which it
 persisted. Reliance, appropriate in the existing circumstances, may indeed have been
 placed on the existing state of the law. Absent an error so clear that it itself serves
 notice of its absurdity, or some other notice that the interpretation is under question,
 there is little justice in a rule permitting the Government to ground adverse consequences
 in another's reliance on existing interpretation. Massey Motors v. United States, supra,
 at 108. Nothing in the decided cases endorses, much less requires, that result; while the
 private citizen may acquire no rights by reliance on erroneous Government interpretation,
 neither should he be found to have lost any through that reliance. Cf. United States v.
 Winegar, 16 I.B.L.A. 112, 4 ENVIRON. L. REP. 30005 (1974).
 155. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
 156. Id. at 755-56 (opinion of Fortas, J.), 771 (opinion of Black, J.). See also
 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974); NLRB
 v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1966).
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 vehicle. Where clear, accessible rules are possible, it disserves the public to
 compel it to disentangle a web of sometimes obscure and hidden law sources.
 Only lawyers stand to gain, if anyone does, from needless complexity. Broader
 participation in the formulation of policy is encouraged in the rulemaking
 context; it both assures direct policy control and reduces somewhat the impact
 of new law on settled expectations. "Since [an agency], unlike a court, does
 have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its
 rulemaking powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to
 formulate new standards of conduct ... ."157
 In the Department of the Interior, however, and perhaps elsewhere, the
 concept of "allocation" suggests processes which do not occur. Coordination,
 unified control over the choice of policymaking technique, much less its out-
 come, is simply lacking. The principal determinants in the largely unconscious
 mechanisms by which issues find their way into one or another process are
 inertia and rulemaking procedures so choked as to be virtually impassable.
 Refurbishing those procedures and establishing techniques for unification of
 policy seem more important than artificial techniques for directing policy
 issues into one or the other channel.
 157. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
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